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INTRODUCTION 
The typical complaint about intellectual property laws is that they are sluggish in 
responding to technological change.  An unfolding question in the contemporary 
era, however, is the degree to which the threat of constitutional challenge will lead 
Congress to further adhere to the status quo.  In the wake of the patent law overhaul 
several years ago,1 for example, the wisdom and scope of those amendments were 
widely debated, but concern about their constitutional soundness was also 
expressed in some quarters.2  Likewise, the latter concern is in play with respect to 
a proposed amendment of the law that applies to sound recordings.  
Amidst the waves of technological innovation affecting access to music, the 
eyes and ears of the music industry, library associations, policy makers and others 
are focused on a legislative decision made some four decades ago.  Specifically, 
these parties are staking out their positions on the possibility of extending federal 
copyright protection to pre-1972 sound recordings.3  Those sound recordings are 
currently protected through 2067 by a patchwork of state laws, and after that date 
all pre-1972 sound recordings will enter the public domain.4 
The U.S. Copyright Office has issued a report recommending that pre-1972 
sound recordings be brought under federal copyright protection in the near future.5  
There are sound reasons for doing so.  The Office’s proposal would result in a 
shorter term of protection for some recordings and effect other changes in the rights 
and responsibilities of right holders and users. 
 
 1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 2. See, e.g., Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., 702 F.3d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge); Andrew L. Sharp, Note, Misguided Patent Reform:  The Questionable 
Constitutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227 (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., John Conyers, Music Legends Deserve R-E-S-P-E-C-T, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2013, 
5:41 PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/01/john-conyers-music-copyright-column/ 
3797485.  
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
 5. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 
(2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf [hereinafter COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE REPORT].  One of the coauthors of this Article, June M. Besek, served as a consultant to the U.S. 
Copyright Office in connection with the Copyright Office Report. 
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This Article examines the constitutional implications of legislation to bring pre-
1972 sound recordings under federal copyright protection (referred to hereafter as 
“federalizing legislation”).  In particular, we consider whether such an amendment 
could violate due process or constitute a taking pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution.6  Using the Copyright Office’s approach as a springboard, we 
consider the issues that would likely arise under any federalizing legislation.  These 
issues, however, have implications far beyond the context of federalizing 
legislation for pre-1972 sound recordings.  Given the proliferation of assets subject 
to intellectual property laws and the increasing role those assets play in the U.S. 
economy, the questions addressed in this Article may bear on Congress’ overall 
ability to amend those laws.7 
This Article first lays out the relevant background to the special treatment of 
pre-1972 sound recordings.  It then describes the legislative changes proposed by 
the Copyright Office.  The Article identifies the most likely points of contention 
among the various stakeholders concerning federalizing legislation.  It then 
assesses the viability of potential takings and due process claims.  We conclude that 
if Congress were to adopt the type of proposal offered by the Copyright Office, 
along with the modifications suggested herein, the principal takings and due 
process concerns would be significantly alleviated.  Such legislation could serve as 
a helpful framework for future amendments to the intellectual property laws. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Although they had existed in various formats for over one hundred years,8 sound 
recordings only received federal copyright protection in the United States effective 
February 15, 1972 through the Sound Recording Amendment.9  That protection 
extended prospectively to sound recordings fixed on or after that date.  Sound 
recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 (“pre-1972 sound recordings”) 
continued to be protected under state law, where they remain today.  At the time of 
the Sound Recording Amendment, most unpublished works in all media were also 
 
 6. The Fifth Amendment provides:  “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 7. For example, the U.S. Register of Copyrights has called for a comprehensive review of the 
Copyright Act, suggesting, inter alia, that Congress may want to alleviate the gridlock resulting from the 
lengthy term of copyright “by reverting works to the public domain after a period of life plus fifty years 
unless heirs or successors register their interests with the Copyright Office.”  The Register’s Call for 
Updates to the U.S. Copyright Law:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop. & the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. 
Register of Copyrights). 
 8. One of the earliest recordings is the French folksong “Au Clair de la Lune,” recorded on April 
9, 1860 by Parisian Édouard-Léon Scott de Martinville.  See Édouard-Léon Scott de Martinville’s 
Phonautograms, FIRST SOUNDS (May 29, 2009), http://www.firstsounds.org/sounds/scott.php. 
 9. The Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  The law was passed on October 15, 1971, and went into effect on 
February 15, 1972.  Id. § 3. 
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protected exclusively by state law.10 
In 1976, Congress created a unitary system of copyright.  The 1976 Copyright 
Act explicitly extended federal copyright protection to unpublished works,11 which, 
up until that point, had enjoyed perpetual protection under state law.  The Act also 
preempted rights equivalent to federal copyright that might be available under state 
common law or state statutory law.12  However, it left pre-1972 sound recordings,13 
published or not, exclusively under state law protection until they enter the public 
domain on February 15, 2067.14 
In recent years, scholarly groups seeking to promote the preservation and study 
of sound recordings have urged that pre-1972 sound recordings be brought under 
federal copyright law.15  In 2009, Congress directed the U.S. Copyright Office to 
evaluate the implications of such a change on the preservation of and access to 
sound recordings as well as the potential economic impact on right holders.16  In its 
December 2011 report, the Office concluded that the best course is for Congress to 
federalize protection for these older recordings.17 
There are several reasons for Congress to extend federal protection to pre-1972 
sound recordings.  First, the elimination of disparate sources of protection in favor 
of a single federal scheme—with a clearer, better defined regime for the 
enforcement of rights—would better implement “the basic constitutional aims of 
 
 10. Under the 1909 federal Copyright Act, works were eligible for federal protection only upon 
publication with a proper copyright notice.  Some categories of works could be federally registered as 
unpublished under the 1909 federal Copyright Act.  Courts generally held that such a federal registration 
divested the work of any state common law rights.  See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16[A][2][c][i]–[ii] (rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012). 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 13. Sound recordings are “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or 
other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which 
they are embodied.”  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).  The complete subsection states: 
With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under 
the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until 
February 15, 2067.  The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights 
and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced on and 
after February 15, 2067.  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no sound recording 
fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title before, on, or after 
February 15, 2067. 
Id.  As passed in 1976, the legislation provided that state laws would not be preempted until February 
15, 2047, but that date was extended to February 15, 2067 by the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 15. See, e.g., ASSOC. FOR RECORDED SOUND COLLECTIONS, LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO 
PRESERVATION OF AND ACCESS TO THE AUDIO HERITAGE OF THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at 
http://www.arsc-audio.org/pdf/ARSC-MLAcopyright.pdf. 
 16. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 111TH CONG., H.R. 1105, PUB. L. NO. 111-8 
[LEGISLATIVE TEXT AND EXPLANATORY STATEMENT] 1769 (Comm. Print 2009).  See also Notice of 
Inquiry, Federal Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings Fixed Before February 15, 1972, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 67,777 (Nov. 3, 2010). 
 17. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 120. 
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uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholarship.”18  Currently, there is a 
significant disparity in the legal treatment of pre-1972 sound recordings, both with 
respect to the state laws and in comparison to other works of authorship protected 
under federal law.19  One consequence of this disparity is that there are almost no 
pre-1972 U.S. sound recordings in the public domain across the United States.20 
Pre-1972 sound recordings are protected by an array of state laws, including 
criminal anti-piracy laws and civil laws—occasionally through civil statutes, but 
usually by common law under a range of different legal theories, including unfair 
competition, misappropriation, common law copyright and others.21  Some states 
have well-defined causes of action; others have no law directly on point.22  In some 
states, right holders may bring claims only against direct commercial competitors.23  
Moreover, states generally do not provide explicit protection for all of the same 
rights that are protected under federal law; for example, digital streaming is 
embraced under the federal right of public performance, but may have no explicit 
state law protection.24 
Second, federal protection would permit scholars, researchers and others seeking 
to use pre-1972 sound recordings to benefit from vital exceptions and defenses to 
alleged infringement, such as fair use and the privileges for libraries and archives in 
§ 108.25  As mentioned, states are entitled to protect pre-1972 sound recordings 
until 2067.  Some states provide for a specific end date before 2067 for such 
protection, but most do not.26  Even recordings dating from the beginning of the 
 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976) (setting out this goal as a basis for supporting the 1976 
Copyright Act). 
 19. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5,  at  13−17,  20−49. 
 20. See id. at 5.  Sound recordings published without copyright notice from 1972–1989 are now 
in the public domain, absent mitigating circumstances.  Id. at 5 n.13.  There are some pre-1972 sound 
recordings that are no longer protected in a particular state or states, but very few are in the public 
domain nationwide.  See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005) 
(affirming New York’s ability to grant common law copyright protection to pre-1976 sound recordings 
that were in the public domain in their country of origin). 
 21. JUNE M. BESEK, COPYRIGHT AND RELATED ISSUES RELEVANT TO DIGITAL PRESERVATION 
AND DISSEMINATION OF UNPUBLISHED PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS BY LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES 
37−39  (2009).    States  may  protect  unpublished  sound  recordings  under  common  law  copyright,  even  if  
they impose a different regime of protection on published sound recordings.  PROGRAM ON INFO. 
JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP., WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, PROTECTION FOR 
PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS UNDER STATE LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON USE BY NONPROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS:  A 10-STATE ANALYSIS 15−19  (2009)  [hereinafter Jaszi Report]. 
 22. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 48.  It is impossible, however, to rule out 
the prospect of protection pursuant to common law tort claims, as the common law evolves over time.  
See id. 
 23. See id. at  35−36,  47. 
 24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (2012).  Other differences between state protection and federal 
protection will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 25. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108.  Section 108 permits libraries and archives to make copies of 
protected works for preservation and replacement, and for individual users, under defined 
circumstances.  Id. § 108. 
 26. California, for example, protects sound recordings only until February 15, 2047.  CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 980(a)(2) (West 2012).  Colorado law provides that, for purposes of criminal enforcement, a 
common law copyright may not last longer than 56 years from when it accrues.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
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twentieth century can potentially enjoy protection in many states. 
Because of the amorphous nature of civil law protection in many states, the 
availability and scope of exceptions akin to fair use or those for libraries and 
archives is uncertain.27  Compounding the problem is the reluctance of many 
librarians and archivists to make certain uses of recordings when the law is 
ambiguous.28  There is also the concern that even if a use is permissible under a 
home  state’s   laws, it may be actionable elsewhere.29  Indeed, the issues raised by 
librarians and archivists, and the effect of federalization of pre-1972 sound 
recordings on preservation, were a principal focus of the Copyright Office Study.30  
Libraries and archives have also indicated that the absence of clear legal authority 
concerning preservation of, and access to, pre-1972 sound recordings adversely 
affects their ability to raise funds for preservation initiatives.31  
Third, granting federal copyright protection would reduce the disparate 
treatment of foreign and domestic pre-1972 sound recordings.  Certain foreign pre-
1972 sound recordings are protected by federal copyright law.  In implementing 
U.S. obligations under the TRIPS Agreement,32 Congress provided federal 
copyright protection for eligible sound recordings of foreign origin which were 
fixed before February 15, 1972.33  For most works, this “copyright restoration” 
 
4-601(1.5) (2012).  2067 is effectively the end date in the many states that protect sound recordings 
pursuant to common law causes of action, for which there is often no specific end date under state law.  
See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 47. 
 27. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 46.  In some states that provide protection 
pursuant to a tort cause of action, certain activities permitted by exceptions under federal copyright law 
may be nonactionable because they do not cause a competitive injury (e.g., they involve uses of the 
recordings by persons other than competitors).  But there nevertheless remains ambiguity about the 
permissibility of certain uses of sound recordings.  This concern weighs more heavily in states like New 
York that base protection on common law copyright, which does not require a competitive injury as a 
component of a claim.  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 266 (N.Y. 
2005). 
 28. See, e.g., Patrick Loughney, Library of Congress, Comments of Library of Congress in 
Response to Notice of Inquiry, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS REGARDING FEDERAL 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS FIXED BEFORE FEB. 15, 1972, at 6 (Nov. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/comments/initial [hereinafter Loughney, Comments 
of Library of Congress in Response to Notice of Inquiry]; Tim Brooks, Ass’n of Recorded Sound 
Collections, Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting 194 (June 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/transcript-06-02-2011.pdf [hereinafter Brooks, 
Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting]. 
 29. See, e.g., Brooks, Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting, supra note 28, at 
36−37. 
 30. See 155 Cong. Rec. H2397 (2009) (directing the Copyright Office to study “the effect of 
federal coverage on the preservation of [pre-1972] sound recordings, the effect on public access to those 
recordings, and the economic impact of federal coverage on rights holders”). 
 31. Loughney, Comments of Library of Congress in Response to Notice of Inquiry, supra note 28, 
at 3−5; Sam Brylawski, Soc. for Am. Music, Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting 
51 (June 2, 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/transcript-06-02-
2011.pdf. 
 32. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1199 (1994).  U.S. obligations under TRIPS were implemented in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109). 
 33. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1), (h)(6)(C) (2012).  Eligible sound recordings were those which 
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occurred automatically on January 1, 1996,34 and restored works are protected in 
the United States for the remainder of the term they would have enjoyed had they 
not entered the public domain.35  In many foreign countries, the term of protection 
for sound recordings on January 1, 1996 was fifty years from first publication or 
fixation.36  Consequently, most foreign sound recordings first fixed in 1946 or later 
have federal copyright protection.37 
Thus, the disparity in the protections for sound recordings in the United States 
weighs in favor of adopting federal copyright protection for pre-1972 sound 
recordings. 
II.  THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT 
In its December 2011 Report, Federal Protection for Pre-1972 Sound 
Recordings, the Copyright Office concluded that federalization “would best serve 
the interest of libraries, archives and others in preserving old sound recordings and 
increasing the availability to the public of old sound recordings.”38  Recognizing 
that librarians and archivists find the scope of existing federal copyright exceptions 
problematic, the Office nevertheless concluded that federal law would provide 
greater certainty and more opportunity to preserve and increase public access to old 
sound recordings than the current state law regime does.39  It also concluded that 
the objections raised by the record companies—principally, that the change would 
wreak havoc on existing ownership rights—could be satisfactorily addressed by 
drafting the legislation so as to ensure that it did not effect a change in ownership 
 
were not in the public domain in their source country on the date of restoration due to expiration of the 
term of protection, had at least one author or right holder who was a national or domiciliary of an 
eligible country when the work was created and (if published) were published in an eligible country and 
not published in the United States within thirty days after foreign publication.  Id. § 104A(a)(1), (h)(6). 
 34. For works whose source countries were members of the Berne Convention or the WTO at the 
time, the restoration date was January 1, 1996; for countries that joined later, it was the date of 
adherence.  17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2).  This legislation is referred to as “copyright restoration” because it 
provided that copyright would be restored to many works that previously had but then lost protection.  
Pre-1972 sound recordings, however, were never eligible for federal copyright. 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1).  See also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (holding that the 
URAA’s copyright restoration provisions were within Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause 
of the Constitution, and the removal of works from the public domain did not violate the First 
Amendment rights of reliance parties who were using the works prior to restoration). 
 36. This is the minimum term of protection provided by the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty art. 17, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76.  The European 
Union recently extended the term of protection for sound recordings (phonograms) to 70 years.  
Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 265) (Sept. 27, 
2011).  Implementation of the extension was required by Nov. 1, 2013 and does not apply to sound 
recordings already in the public domain.  See id. 
 37. Conversely, almost all pre-1946 foreign sound recordings are in the public domain as far as 
federal copyright law is concerned.  However, these pre-1946 foreign sound recordings may still be 
protected under state law.  See Capitol  Records,   Inc.  v.  Naxos  of  Am.,   Inc.,  830  N.E.2d  250,  263−66  
(N.Y. 2005). 
 38. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at viii. 
 39. Id. 
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of rights in pre-1972 sound recordings.40 
Specifically, the Office recommended that pre-1972 sound recordings be 
brought under federal copyright law with the same rights, exceptions and 
limitations as sound recordings created in 1972 and thereafter.41  Furthermore, the 
initial owner of the federal copyright would be the person who owns the rights in 
the recording under state law just prior to when the federal law becomes effective.42 
The proposed scheme would effectively give all newly-federalized sound 
recordings, no matter how old, some minimum period of protection.43  Sound 
recordings published before 1923 would get a “transition period” of at least three 
years of federal protection, with the possibility of twenty-five years in total if, 
during the transition period, the right holder met certain “extended term 
requirements,” which entail:  (1) making the sound recording available to the public 
at a reasonable price; (2) filing a notice in the Copyright Office to signify its intent 
to achieve maximum protection and (3) continuing to make the work available at a 
reasonable price throughout the extended term.44  
Sound recordings published in 1923 or later would be protected until the 
expiration of ninety-five years from first publication (as defined by the federal 
copyright law),45 though they would get a transition period of six to ten years of 
protection and the further possibility of federal protection until February 15, 2067 
through compliance with the extended term requirements.  Sound recordings 
unpublished as of the effective date of the federalizing legislation would get a term 
of 120 years from fixation, or to the end of a six-to-ten-year transition period 
(whichever expires later), but in no event beyond 2067.46  If the 120-year term 
would expire before 2067, the unpublished sound recordings—like sound 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at  ix−x. 
 42. The Report also recognized that certain adjustments should be considered with respect to the 
federal requirements of timely registration as a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees and statutory 
damages in an infringement suit, and to other provisions such as 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2012), which deals 
with priority of conflicting transfers. 
 43. The proposed terms are analogous to the terms of protection provided for works created prior 
to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act.  See 17  U.S.C.  §§  303,  304(a)−(b).    However,  the  Office  
purposely suggested a term that did not rely on a measuring life, in contrast to unpublished works 
brought under federal law in the 1976 Copyright Act, which received a term of life plus fifty years (later 
extended to life plus seventy years), as well as a minimum term of at least twenty-five years under 17 
U.S.C. § 303. 
 44. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177.  The Report addressed the possibility of a 
Fifth Amendment takings claim and concluded that various aspects of its proposed legislation, including 
the transition period and the opportunity to achieve a longer period of protection, “significantly 
diminish[] . . . the likelihood of success of any takings claim . . . .”  Id. at  166−67. 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) defines “publication” as: 
[t]he distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.  The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a 
group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, 
constitutes publication.  A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute 
publication. 
Id. 
 46. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at ix. 
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recordings published in 1923 or later—would have the possibility of protection 
until 2067 through compliance with the extended term requirements. 
III.  POTENTIAL LEGAL EFFECTS OF FEDERALIZATION 
A.  ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING FEDERALIZATION 
In analyzing whether federalizing legislation would encroach on rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, we operate on the assumption that the 
legislation would follow the broad outlines of the U.S. Copyright Office’s proposal, 
discussed above.  That this formulation, informed as it was by comments from 
many of the relevant stakeholders, is a useful starting point for our discussion.  
Even if federalizing legislation as enacted differs from the Copyright Office’s 
proposal, the due process and takings concerns discussed below will remain 
relevant.  Accordingly, as of the effective date of the legislation (assumed, for the 
purposes of this article, to be January 1, 2015), all pre-1972 sound recordings 
would be protected under federal copyright law, and all state rights with respect to 
copyright and copyright-like protection of pre-1972 sound recordings would be 
preempted. 
Pre-1972 sound recordings would have the term of protection described in the 
Copyright Office Report, discussed above.  A transition period of three years for 
sound recordings published prior to 1923 and a transition period of six years for 
other pre-1972 sound recordings will be assumed. 
B.  THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGE 
If protection for pre-1972 sound recordings were brought under federal law, how 
would the nature and scope of protection differ from what it is now?47 
1.  Term of Protection 
If federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings effected a significant reduction in 
the term of protection, it could diminish an expected income stream for right 
holders who might otherwise market recordings with commercial value.  The 
impact of federalization on the expected income stream would vary substantially 
with the value of the individual recording and with the number of years by which 
the term is diminished. 
The potential term change is best analyzed with specific examples.  In each of 
the examples below, the term of protection the recording would receive under the 
hypothetical federalizing statute is compared to a term of protection in New York, 
where pre-1972 sound recordings, whether published or not, are protected by 
 
 47. A comparison between state and federal law protection could itself be the basis of a law 
review article.  We have tried to highlight here the principal differences that might bear on the takings 
and due process issues. 
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common law copyright until 2067.48 
1920 published recording:  Under the federalizing legislation, protection for 
such a recording would expire on January 1, 2018 (three years from the effective 
date of the legislation) unless, during that three-year transition period, the right 
holder were to meet the extended term requirements, in which case the recording 
would be protected under federal law for a total of twenty-five years, until 2040.  
Thus the term will be reduced by at least twenty-seven years in comparison with 
New  York  (2067−2040),  and  as  much  as  forty-nine years if the right holder fails to 
meet  the  extended  term  requirements  (2067−2018).49 
1923 published recording:  Under the federalizing legislation, protection would 
last until 2018 (ninety-five years from publication), but the assumed six-year 
transition period would ensure protection until the beginning of 2021, for a loss of 
forty-six  years  of  protection  in  comparison  with  New  York  (2067−2021).    A  right  
holder could, however, achieve federal protection until 2067 by meeting the 
extended term requirements. 
1960 published recording:  Under the federalizing legislation, protection would 
expire in 2055 (ninety-five years from publication), for a loss of twelve years of 
protection  compared  with  New  York  (2067−2055).   A right holder could, however, 
get federal protection until 2067 by meeting the extended term requirement. 
Unpublished recording created in 1940:50  Under the federalizing legislation, 
unpublished recordings would be protected until 120 years after fixation, but no 
later than 2067.  So the sound recording in question would be protected until 2060 
(for a loss of seven years compared with New York), or until 2067 if the right 
holder meets the extended term requirements. 
Unpublished recording created in 1970:  Under the federalizing legislation, the 
term would last until 120 years after fixation, but no later than 2067.  Since 1970 
plus 120 years would be 2090, the unpublished recording would be protected under 
federal law until 2067 but no longer, and federalization would not alter its term of 
protection as compared with New York. 
2.  Rights 
Federal copyright law provides right holders with a set of rights:  reproduction, 
 
 48. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).  Many states 
base protection on common law unfair competition principles, which have no temporal endpoint (other 
than the externally imposed federal preemption deadline of 2067); but protection would effectively 
cease if the sound recording at issue had no commercial value, so for any given recording, the term may 
effectively be shorter than 2047.  The differences among states might become relevant if a right holder 
were to bring an “as applied” challenge alleging a taking had occurred. 
 49. These dates are approximate because federal preemption occurs on Feb. 15, 2067, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301(c), but federal terms generally last until the end of the year in which they would otherwise expire, 
17 U.S.C. § 305. 
 50. While one might argue that a sound recording that has not been commercialized is less likely 
to create a takings problem, it does not necessarily follow that such recordings have no commercial 
value (such that takings claims could not even be raised). 
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adaptation, distribution, public performance and public display.51  The public 
performance right in sound recordings is limited to the right “to perform the work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”52  Performance by other means, 
such as analog transmission, is not restricted by federal copyright.53 
Although not technically a “right” of the owner, some protection for pre-1972 
sound recordings is provided by criminal anti-piracy laws in nearly every state, 
although the laws vary and it is not clear how many cases are brought pursuant to 
these laws.54  On the civil side, states generally provide protection for pre-1972 
sound recordings through common law, although some states, like California, have 
civil statutes that address unauthorized use of pre-1972 sound recordings.  States 
may treat unauthorized reproduction and distribution of pre-1972 sound recordings 
as unfair competition or misappropriation, a violation of “common law copyright,” 
or as another type of civil wrong.55  Where the cause of action is grounded in unfair 
competition or misappropriation, evidence of a competing use and/or commercial 
benefit to the user is usually required to establish a claim.  A claim grounded in 
common law copyright does not require such a showing.56 
It is apparent that duplication and distribution rights are recognized under state 
law.57  The existence of a derivative work right under state law is less well 
established; there is some support for its existence, but there are too few cases to 
establish whether it can be considered similar in scope to the derivative work right 
under federal law.58 
 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 106.  The federal display right is not of major significance for sound recordings 
themselves, though it may be for cover artwork. 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).  See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995), amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-304, 112  Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000)).  Certain types of digital audio 
transmissions, such as webcasting, are subject to a statutory license.  The sound recording copyright 
owner may not prevent these transmissions, but the transmitting party must pay royalties.  17 U.S.C. 
§ 114(d)(2).  The rate is set by the Copyright Royalty Board, and the royalties are distributed to 
recording companies and performers by an organization called SoundExchange.  Performances such as 
interactive digital audio services (on-demand streaming) that are perceived to involve a high risk of 
copying, or of substituting for the sale of copies, require a negotiated license.  17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2), 
(3), (4)(A). 
 53. Legislation is pending in Congress to, inter alia, include audio transmissions within the public 
performance right for sound recordings.  Free Market Royalty Act, H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 54. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5,  at  20−28. 
 55. Id. at  28−43;;  see also Jaszi Report, supra note 21, at 13–19.  Some states have no reported 
cases on pre-1972 sound recordings, so it is unclear whether and how they would provide civil law 
protection against unauthorized uses.  Most states would likely protect unpublished sound recordings 
under a common law copyright regime.  See id. at  4−5  (explaining  that  common  law  copyright  protects  
against unauthorized use of recordings prior to their first publication). 
 56. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 266 (N.Y. 2005). 
 57. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 341 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1975); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
 58. In Capitol Records v. Naxos, for example, the New York Court of Appeals rejected Naxos’s 
claim that its remastering of the Capitol recordings to enhance sound quality resulted in “new products” 
that did not infringe the originals, since the remastered recordings still utilized elements of the original 
recordings.  Capitol Records, Inc., 830 N.E.2d at 267.  The federal derivative work right for sound 
recordings is narrower than that for other copyrighted works; it does not encompass imitations of a 
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In general, states do not appear to recognize a right of public performance in 
pre-1972 sound recordings,59 and a few states restrict such a right by statute.60  
Such recordings are regularly played, broadcast and streamed without a performing 
rights license;61 they do not have the benefit of an explicit right of public 
performance by means of digital audio transmissions provided to federally 
protected sound recordings by § 106(6) of the Copyright Act.62 
Thus, bringing pre-1972 sound recordings under the protection of federal law 
would provide right holders with a clearer and more consistent set of rights, 
including a better defined derivative work right, as well as a right of public 
performance for digital transmissions.63 
3.  Exceptions 
Federal copyrights are subject to various exceptions and limitations, as set out in 
§§ 107 to 122 of the Act.  The exceptions include, inter alia, fair use, exceptions for 
libraries and archives and educational exceptions for face-to-face classroom use 
and distance education.64 
It is often unclear what exceptions and limitations are available under the 
various state laws.65  Most of the state cases involve commercial duplication and 
distribution of entire recordings, and there is little law addressing commercial, 
transformative uses of less than an entire recording, such as might be found in 
typical sampling practices, or noncommercial uses generally.  In many states, 
noncommercial uses for scholarship, teaching and preservation would simply not 
 
performance in a sound recording if the sounds in the recording are independently fixed.  17 U.S.C. § 
114(b) (2012).  Performers have succeeded in bringing “right of publicity” actions against sound-alikes 
under state law.  See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).  Presumably, such 
holdings would be unaffected by federalizing protection for pre-1972 sound recordings. 
 59. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d  86,  89−90  (2d  Cir.  1940). 
 60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-28 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-510 (2011). 
 61. See David Oxenford, Nat’l  Ass’n  of  Broadcasters,  Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings 
Public   Meeting   326−27   (June   2,   2011),   available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/ 
transcript-06-02-2011.pdf; see generally R. Bruce Rich, Todd D. Larson & Cynthia Greer, Sirius XM 
Radio, Comments of Sirius XM Radio in Response to Notice of Inquiry, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
COMMENTS REGARDING FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS FIXED BEFORE 
FEB. 15, 1972 (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/comments/reply. 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114.  It is possible that a court might find streaming, particularly on-
demand streaming, to be a violation of state rights in a pre-1972 sound recording because it could, in 
effect, substitute for a purchase of the recording.  However, no court has yet been confronted with this 
issue, which will likely be resolved in the context of pending suits.  See, e.g., Complaint at 6, 
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01290, 2013 WL 521902 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 
2013) (alleging that Sirius withheld from SoundExchange royalties owed for the performance of pre-
1972 sound recordings, in violation of §§ 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act); see also Hannah Karp, 
Sirius is Sued Over Music Royalties for Pre-1972 Recordings, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324591204579037260890310376. 
 63. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114. 
 64. 17  U.S.C.  §§  107,  108,  110(1)−(2). 
 65. The California civil statute has exceptions, as do many state criminal laws (discussed below), 
but they do not cover the range of uses for which exceptions are available under federal law.  See 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5,  at  26−27. 
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meet the criteria for a cause of action under state law, since there is no commercial 
benefit to the user.66 
State common law copyright provides a broad form of protection to right holders 
that is more analogous to federal copyright, since no competitive injury need be 
shown.  While a recent New York case applied fair use under common law to the 
use of a pre-1972 sound recording,67 that is but a single state law case, and provides 
no basis from which to conclude that other state courts would apply a robust fair 
use doctrine.  Moreover, there are no state common law doctrines analogous to 
other federal law exceptions, such as § 110(2) for distance education or § 108 for 
library and archive uses.  If protection for pre-1972 sound recordings were 
federalized, fair use and library exceptions would be consistently available.68 
4.  Ownership 
The laws regarding ownership and transfers of rights in sound recordings may 
differ between state and federal law.  For example, federal copyright law contains 
provisions to determine who the initial author of a work is, and whether a valid 
transfer of copyright rights has occurred.  Under federal law, the individual creator 
of a work is the initial author unless the work is a “work made for hire.”69  If the 
work qualifies as a work made for hire, then the employer or commissioning party, 
and not the individual creator, is deemed the author (and thus the initial owner of 
all rights, unless the parties agree otherwise).70  The extent to which any particular 
state would recognize the work made for hire doctrine with respect to pre-1972 
sound recordings, and under what circumstances, is unclear; in many states, there 
 
 66. See id. at 27; Jaszi Report, supra note 21,  at  10−11. 
 67. EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 7485 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2008). 
 68. Another change that might occur if pre-1972 sound recordings were brought under federal 
protection has to do with the safe harbor from copyright liability for service providers in § 512 of the 
federal copyright law.  Two courts have now read § 512 to encompass common law copyright claims 
concerning pre-1972 sound recordings.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F.Supp.2d 627, 
640−42 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); UMG  Recordings,  Inc.  v.  Escape  Media  Grp.,  Inc.,  948  N.Y.S.2d  881,  886−87  
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).  If these rulings are sustained, it appears that federalization of pre-1972 sound 
recordings would work no change, at least as to claims denominated as “copyright.”  See Capitol 
Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, Nos. 09 Civ. 10101(RA), 09 Civ. 10105(RA), 2013 WL 5272932 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013) (denying safe harbor protection for pre-1972 sound recordings), certified for 
interlocutory appeal, Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC Nos. 09 Civ. 10101(RA), 09 Civ. 
10105(RA), 2013 WL 6869648 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2013); COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 
130−32  (expressing  doubts  about  whether  § 512 encompasses common law copyright claims concerning 
pre-1972 sound recordings).  Nevertheless, other types of claims with respect to pre-1972 sound 
recordings—unfair competition, misappropriation, conversion and the like—are presumably not covered 
by § 512.  See Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in a Digital World:  Providing Federal 
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 66 (2009).  
Accordingly, if pre-1972 sound recordings were brought under federal law, service providers would 
have a more comprehensive safe harbor with respect to those recordings. 
 69. 17  U.S.C.  §  201(a)−(b).    For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  work  made  for  hire  doctrine,  see  2  
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, at § 5.03 [A], [B][1][a][i]. 
 70. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
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are no cases on point.71 
Another principle of current federal copyright law is that ownership of the 
physical copy in which a protected work is embodied is distinct from ownership of 
the underlying intellectual property rights, and transfer of the physical object does 
not convey the underlying rights, in the absence of an agreement to that effect.72  
State law applicable to pre-1972 recordings could differ.  In some cases, courts 
prior to 1978 found that the sale or transfer of a material object also transferred the 
common law copyright with respect to the work embodied in that object, unless the 
creator specifically reserved those rights.73  This principle, sometimes referred to as 
the “Pushman doctrine,” was repudiated by statute in New York and California, at 
least for works of fine art.74  Nevertheless, it remains possible that courts would 
apply this principle to pre-1972 sound recording masters, and this might vary from 
state to state.75 
In any event, application of federal law rather than state law to pre-1972 sound 
recordings could effect a change in ownership, upsetting existing business 
expectations.  To avoid potential confusion, federalizing legislation should provide 
that initial ownership of the federal copyright in these recordings be determined by 
state law, as would the validity of any transfers made prior to the effective date of 
the legislation.76  Even without an explicit statutory directive, it is likely that courts 
would endeavor to uphold expectations about ownership;77 nevertheless, an explicit 
 
 71. We thank Professor Elizabeth Townsend Gard, her student Dan Collier, and the Tulane Law 
Center for Intellectual Property, Media and Culture for providing us with helpful research on the 
methodologies for determining rights ownership in pre-1972 sound recordings under state law. 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 202. 
 73. See, e.g., Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc., Inc., 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1942) (“[A]n artist 
must, if he wishes to retain or protect the reproduction right, make some reservation of that right when 
he sells the painting.”). 
 74. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 10.09[B][2]. 
 75. See Polygram Records, Inc. v. Legacy Entm’t Grp., 205 S.W.3d 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(owner of original acetate recordings of Hank Williams radio shows retrieved from the trash did not hold 
the intellectual property rights therein; possession of tangible copies alone did not convey intangible 
rights). 
 76. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5,  at  147−48;;  accord Erlinger, supra note 68, at 
75−76   (“Accordingly, the federal Copyright Act should not be used to determine ownership interests 
[including initial and transfer rights] in domestic, pre-1972 sound recordings.  Rather, courts should look 
to determine ownership by applying the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the 
sound recording and the parties.”). 
 77. By analogy, despite some initial concern that the 1976 Copyright Act might be applied to 
determine copyright ownership in works created before the Act came into effect, case law has not borne 
out this concern.  See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 1.11.  In litigation occurring after the 
effective date of the 1976 Act, courts have continued to look to the law in effect at the time of the 
relevant conduct—either the 1909 Copyright Act or state law—in determining copyright ownership.  
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(applying “work for hire” doctrine of 1909 Act where allegedly infringed work was published before the 
effective date of the 1976 Act, even though alleged act of infringement occurred after the effective date 
of the 1976 Act); Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Section 301 [of the 1976 Act] 
does not . . . purport to determine who holds a copyright for works created before January 1978.  It 
merely clarifies the rights of individuals owning copyrights on that date, whomever they may be.”). 
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textual commitment to preserve ownership status is clearly preferable.78 
5.  Remedies 
Federal copyright law provides that an infringer of copyright is liable for the 
actual damages suffered by the copyright owner, as well as any profits of the 
infringer attributable to the infringement to the extent they have not been taken into 
account in determining actual damages.79  In addition, a prevailing plaintiff who 
has registered his copyright in a timely manner is eligible to instead opt for 
statutory damages.80  Statutory damages can range from $750 to $30,000 per work, 
and up to $150,000 per work if the infringement was committed willfully.81  While 
actual or compensatory damages are also available under state law, statutory 
damages are not.82  Instead, state laws may permit the award of punitive or 
exemplary damages,83 an avenue not permitted under federal copyright law.84 
Another remedy available under federal law to right holders who have timely 
registered their works is an award of costs and attorney’s fees at the court’s 
discretion.85  There is no corollary under state law. 
6.  Formalities 
In order to bring an action for copyright infringement of a work of U.S. origin, 
the right holder must first register the work in the United States Copyright Office.86  
 
 78. Similarly, provision would have to be made to ensure that owners of rights in pre-1972 sound 
recordings are not disadvantaged for failing to comply with federal priority-of-transfer rules prior to 
federalization.  See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2012); infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 79. It also provides for remedies other than damages:  a court may enter a preliminary or 
permanent injunction against continuing infringement and may order impoundment and reasonable 
disposition of infringing articles.  17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503. 
 80. The copyright owner may elect statutory damages at any time before final judgment.  17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).  For what constitutes “timely” registration for this purpose, see the discussion of 
formalities infra Part III.B.6. 
 81. 17   U.S.C.   §   504(c)(1)−(2).    The court may reduce the award to $200 per work if the 
infringement was innocent, and must remit statutory damages entirely when the infringement was done 
by an employee or agent of a nonprofit library, archive or educational institution who believed and had 
reason to believe the use was a fair use.  Id. § 504(c)(2).  There is a similar provision with respect to 
certain nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity.  Id. 
 82. See, e.g.,  A&M  Records,  Inc.  v.  Heilman,  142  Cal.  Rptr.  390,  399−400  (Cal.  Ct. App. 1977) 
(defendant may be assessed damages for unfair competition); GAI Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad.   Sys.,   Inc.,   340   A.2d   736,   753−54   (Md.   Ct.   Spec.   App.   1975)   (awarding   compensatory   and  
punitive damages for record piracy). 
 83. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470, 490 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(awarding $3.5 million in punitive damages for unlicensed sampling of a recording deemed 
unconstitutionally excessive; remanding case to district court with instruction to apply a punitive to 
compensatory damages ratio of 2:1 or 1:1); U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, 
Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming punitive damages award for misappropriation 
of a sound recording); see 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 14.02[C][2]. 
 84. See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001); Hays v. Sony Corp. of 
Am., 847 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).  To register, the claimant must file an application for registration, pay the 
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Thus, registration is a condition of suit, but registration may be made any time 
before suit is filed.  If, however, a right holder wants to ensure the availability of 
statutory damages or attorney’s fees, registration must be made before the 
infringement commences or, in the case of a published work, within three months 
of first publication.87  State laws have no comparable registration requirements. 
C.  POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS WHO MIGHT CLAIM A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEPRIVATION 
Having briefly considered how current state law rights differ from the rights that 
would be available under federalized protection for pre-1972 sound recordings, this 
Article will now identify the possible stakeholders who might claim a constitutional 
deprivation.88 
The first group is comprised of right holders whose sound recordings would 
have abbreviated terms of protection under federal law.  These right holders fall, in 
turn, into two categories.  The first are those who would be entitled to federal 
copyright protection until 2067 provided that they meet the extended term 
requirements.89  Such right holders might attempt to claim that those requirements 
unconstitutionally burden their rights in pre-1972 sound recordings.  The second 
overlapping category of right holders are those whose rights will be truncated 
regardless of whether they meet the extended term requirements:  specifically, 
owners of sound recordings published prior to 1923 whose recordings would, at 
most, receive only twenty-five years of federal protection.90 
The second group is comprised of right holders who might argue that the federal 
rights and remedies are substantively inferior to a significant enough extent that 
their application would violate due process or constitute a taking.  Among the 
claims that might conceivably be raised are the financial and logistical demands of 
 
registration   fee  and  deposit  a  copy  or  copies  of   the  work.     17  U.S.C.  §  408(a)−(b).     Effective  May  1,  
2014, the fee for online registration will be $55, unless it is an online registration of a single work (not a 
work made for hire) by an individual author, in which case it will be $35.  Paper filings will have an $85 
fee.  See Copyright Office Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/sl04_2014.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2014).  The effective date of registration is the date that the application, fee and 
deposit copies have all been received by the Copyright Office.  17 U.S.C. § 410(d). 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 412.  In other words, if a work is published and then infringed, the right holder 
will be entitled to statutory damages even if the registration is made after the infringement commences, 
as long as the effective date of the registration is within three months of first publication.  See id.  The 
statute also provides for “preregistration” of certain unpublished works being prepared for commercial 
distribution, including sound recordings, that have a history of infringement prior to commercial 
distribution.  17 U.S.C. § 408(f). 
 88. The Tucker Act provides that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims against 
the United States “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated 
or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”  28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012); accord 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Generally, an individual claiming that the 
United States has taken his property can seek just compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
1491.”). 
 89. See supra Part II. 
 90. See supra Part II. 
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timely registering the copyrights in pre-1972 sound recordings, a prerequisite to 
statutory damages under federal copyright law,91 and relatedly, the loss of the 
potential for punitive damages under state law. 
The third group is comprised of users of pre-1972 sound recordings whose pre-
federalization activities arguably did not violate state laws but may, upon 
federalization, violate the ambit of federal law protections accorded to right 
holders.92 
Accordingly, we now consider the merits of these claims. 
IV.  RETROACTIVITY 
Congressional extension of federal protection would necessarily entail a 
concomitant revocation of the state law regime that currently governs pre-1972 
sound recordings.  The concerns raised by a revocation of these protections did not 
arise when Congress first extended federal copyright protection to sound recordings 
in 1971.  As discussed earlier, that legislation operated prospectively, providing an 
exclusive federal right to reproduce and distribute sound recordings “fixed, 
published, and copyrighted on and after” February 15, 1972.93 
A.  GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As a starting point, “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law.”94  “Elementary 
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to 
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled 
expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”95  Thus, “[s]tatutes are disfavored as 
retroactive when their application ‘would impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed.’”96  Determining whether a statute 
 
 91. Timely registration is also required for an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in 
a copyright action, and registration is required as a condition of suit for U.S. works.  17 U.S.C. §§ 
411(a), 412. 
 92. See, e.g., Abigail Phillips, Elec. Frontier Found., Comments of EFF in Response to Notice of 
Inquiry 13−15, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS REGARDING FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
OF SOUND RECORDINGS FIXED BEFORE FEB. 15, 1972 (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/ 
docs/sound/comments/initial/.  Certain users (webcasters and on-demand streamers) would, in the wake 
of the federalizing legislation, have to pay a performance royalty under 17 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 114 in 
connection with the digital transmission of pre-1972 sound recordings.  It seems doubtful that the 
imposition of royalties (which right holders in post-1972 sound recordings already pay) would raise 
cognizable Fifth Amendment problems. 
 93. See Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971) 
(providing, in pertinent part, an effective date of February 15, 1972). 
 94. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
 95. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994); see also Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004) (“The aim of the presumption [against retroactivity] is to avoid 
unnecessary post hoc changes to legal rules on which parties relied in shaping their primary conduct.”). 
 96. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280); 
see also Altmann, 541 U.S. at 693 (“[R]etroactive statutes may upset settled expectations by ‘tak[ing] 
away or impair[ing] vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creat[ing] a new obligation, 
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operates retroactively, however, is no “simple or mechanical task.”97  On the one 
hand, the Supreme Court has framed the inquiry as whether the new statute 
“attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”98  On 
the other hand, the Court has also said that a statute is not retroactive “merely 
because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s 
enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law.”99 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to address in the abstract the question of the 
potential retroactive effects of any federalizing legislation.  Where Congress is 
clear as to a statute’s reach, the statute may operate “retroactively” as long as it 
does not run afoul of the specific anti-retroactivity restrictions imposed by the 
Constitution.100  The reason for this is that 
[r]etroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, whether 
to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, . . . or simply to give comprehensive 
effect to a new law Congress considers salutary.  However, a requirement that 
Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has 
determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or 
unfairness.101 
Therefore, if Congress enacts federalizing legislation with a clear temporal reach, it 
will only remain to consider constitutional barriers to its enactment. 
B.  APPLICATIONS TO FEDERALIZING LEGISLATION 
This Article first identifies lines that Congress could draw clearly and that would 
minimize any retroactive effect of the federalizing legislation.  Accordingly, it 
 
impos[ing] a new duty, or attach[ing] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations 
already past.’” (citations omitted) (alterations in original)). 
 97. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268; id. at 270 (“Any test of retroactivity will leave room for 
disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify . . . legal changes with perfect philosophical 
clarity.”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change:  An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. 
L. REV.  1055,  1072−73   (1997)   (articulating  an  approach   to   retroactivity   that   requires   less  of  a  binary  
determination and more of a classification by degree of effect).  Retroactivity concerns may arise when a 
court is asked to apply a new statutory provision to pending proceedings.  See, e.g., Martin v. Hadix, 527 
U.S. 343, 347 (1999); Landgraf,  511  U.S.  at  249−50.  They may also arise when a court must decide 
whether to apply a statute to conduct that allegedly pre-dates the effective date of the statute.  See, e.g., 
Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1484 (2012); Fernandez-Vargas,  548  U.S.  at  45−47. 
 98. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270; accord Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1491. 
 99. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 (citation omitted). 
 100. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (“Despite the dangers inherent in retroactive 
legislation, it is beyond dispute that, within constitutional limits, Congress has the power to enact laws 
with retrospective effect.  A statute may not be applied retroactively, however, absent a clear indication 
from Congress that it intended such a result.” (citation omitted)); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (identifying 
as the relevant provisions:  the Ex Post Facto Clauses, the Contracts Clause, the Takings Clause, the 
prohibitions against Bills of Attainder and the Due Process Clause). 
 101. Landgraf,   511  U.S.   at   267−68.     Where  Congress  has  not  made   the   reach of the legislation 
clear, the Supreme Court has instituted a judicial presumption against giving legislation retroactive 
effect.  See id.  It has applied this presumption against statutory retroactivity most frequently to “new 
provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of 
prime importance.”  Id. at 271. 
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assumes that a further constitutional analysis is not warranted with respect to the 
following topics. 
First, and critically, federalizing legislation should make explicit that it would 
not effect a change in ownership.  Second, Congress should make clear that 
federalizing legislation applies only to cases commenced after the effective date of 
the legislation.  Even with respect to litigation commenced after the statute’s 
effective date, Congress should make clear that federal copyright law would be 
applicable only to infringement-related activities in connection with pre-1972 
sound recordings that occur on or after the effective date.  That is, it should be 
modeled after the 1976 Copyright Act, which provided that federal law would not 
annul or limit any state law rights or remedies with respect to “any cause of action 
arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978.”102  Accordingly, a 
federal action for copyright infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings should not 
reach allegedly infringing activities that occur prior to the effective date. 
Similarly, federal limitations and exceptions should be applied only to post-
federalization activities.  Thus, a fair use defense to alleged infringement occurring 
before the statute’s effective date should be available only to the extent it would 
have been available under the applicable state law.  Likewise, webcasting a pre-
1972 sound recording would be subject to the digital audio performance right under 
17 U.S.C. § 114, including the statutory license, only if done after the effective 
date.103 
There are many other ways in which Congress could minimize any retroactive 
effect.  In brief, the federalizing legislation’s termination provisions should be 
made applicable only to post-federalization grants.104  Right holders should be 
given a reasonable opportunity to register their works.  Likewise, the term 
“infringement” in the federal provisions concerning statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees105 should be defined to mean infringement under federal law.  This 
would prevent a right holder from being foreclosed from seeking those remedies 
for failure to register before any unauthorized reproduction or distribution 
commenced, even though the work was not then eligible for federal copyright 
registration.  By the same token, federal statutory damages should apply only to 
infringing conduct that occurred after federalization to avoid attaching new 
 
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2).  In general, “undertakings” has referred to “infringement.”  See infra 
note 295 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *17 (D. Colo. Apr. 
20, 2005) (holding URAA Section 514 not retroactive because while it “grants many retroactive benefits 
to authors, it does not impose retroactive burdens upon the plaintiffs.  This is because Section 514 does 
not impose upon the plaintiffs liability for, or new duties as a result of, their past conduct.  Nor does 
Section 514 impair rights that the plaintiffs possessed when they acted.  In short, Section 514 does not 
alter the legal consequences of the plaintiffs’ completed acts” (citations omitted)). 
 104. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at ix.  Federal law provides for the possibility 
of terminating a grant made by the author after thirty-five years, to allow the author or her heirs to 
renegotiate a grant that may have been made when the value of the work was not known.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 203(a).  Certain grants with respect to works published prior to January 1, 1978 can be terminated 
under different conditions.  See id. § 304(c)−(d). 
 105. Id. § 412. 
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consequences to prior acts.106 
Finally, under federal law, it is criminal infringement to “willfully” infringe a 
copyright “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain” or to 
make copies with a total retail value of more than $1,000 within a 180-day 
period.107  State criminal laws generally require proof that the infringing activity 
was done for commercial advantage and do not provide that such intent can be 
imputed by the volume or dollar value of the copies made.108  To ensure the 
federalizing legislation has no retroactive effect in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause,109 it should be made clear that the volume or retail value of copies illegally 
sold prior to the effective date of federalization would not be considered in 
determining federal criminal liability.110 
The following areas comprise the central focus of the remainder of this Article: 
 Foreshortened term of protection.  For sound recordings published prior to 
1923, right holders would have to relinquish years of state law copyright 
ownership because they would be eligible for a maximum of twenty-five 
additional years of protection.  (Right holders in later or unpublished 
recordings, if they took no action, would also face such forced 
relinquishment.) 
 Obligation to make the work reasonably available and to file a notice in the 
Copyright Office.  To meet the extended term requirements, right holders of 
sound recordings would have to file notices in the Copyright Office and 
make the recordings available.  These obligations might conceivably entail 
financial or other hardships. 
 Registration.  Right holders would have to expend funds to register their 
recordings with the Copyright Office to qualify for statutory damages or 
attorney’s fees, or to bring an infringement action if the recording is a 
United States work. 
 Substitution of federal rights and remedies.  Federal rights would displace 
 
 106. The priority of transfer rules in § 205(d) should be amended to give right holders a reasonable 
opportunity to register and record past transfers in the Copyright Office.  Section 205(d) provides that 
where there are conflicting transfers, priority is given to the one executed first if it is recorded in the 
Copyright Office within one month after its execution (or within two months if it was executed outside 
the United States).  17 U.S.C. § 205(c). 
 107. 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
 108. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 540.11 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21–21(c) (West 2012).  The 
volume sold may, however, affect the penalty.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 540.11(2)(b) (2012); N.Y. PENAL 
CODE § 275.05 (McKinney 2012).  To the extent that right holders are dissatisfied with the displacement 
of state criminal law by federal criminal law, the Supreme Court has held that the “benefit that a third 
party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections 
under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.”  Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 110. To avoid complicated issues concerning the copyright status of musical or other works 
embodied only in a phonorecord prior to when sound recordings were eligible for federal copyright, and 
in particular, concerning whether those underlying works should be considered to have been “fixed,” we 
recommend that the federalizing legislation provide that it is not intended to affect the copyright status 
of any underlying work. 
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state rights; statutory damages claims would replace state punitive damages 
claims. 
 Restrictions on users.  Uses currently being made under state law might be 
restricted if federal law is applied. 
With respect to these issues, we also assume that Congress could draft the 
operative language to make clear the activities to which it applies.  But, anticipating 
the argument that such aspects work a constitutionally impermissible retroactive 
change, we spend the remainder of the Article considering whether these aspects 
would violate the two relevant constitutional provisions:  the Takings Clause and 
the Due Process Clause. 
V.  THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Amendment protects property against incursions by the federal 
government in at least two ways.  It ensures both that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
deprived of . . . property, without due process of law” and that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”111  Whereas the 
Takings Clause “presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid 
public purpose,” the Due Process Clause addresses the anterior question of whether 
a regulation “fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective.”112  The 
relationship between takings and due process analyses is complex.113  Indeed, in the 
copyright context, the plaintiffs in recent litigation over the removal of certain 
foreign works from the public domain challenged the operative federal statute on 
the ground of substantive due process, rather than takings.114  Accordingly, both 
 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Takings Clause applies to the states by way of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005) (citing Chicago, B. & 
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).  Cases addressing takings challenges to federal activities 
routinely rely upon case law addressing takings challenges to state activities.  See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 
481  U.S.  704,  713−14  (1987).    Accordingly,  in  this  Article,  we  rely  upon  both  lines  of  precedent  when  
analyzing possible takings challenges to the federalizing legislation. 
  Similarly, the texts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses are 
“substantively identical.”  Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 885, 886 n.1 (2000).  In considering due process challenges to economic legislation, the Supreme 
Court has applied the same principles to state and federal legislation.  See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 
729−30  (1984).    This Article also draws upon both lines of precedent. 
 112. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542–43 (2005); see also id. at 543 (noting that 
the question of a regulation’s underlying validity—or whether the government has acted so arbitrarily as 
to violate due process—is “logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects 
a taking”); id. at   548   (Kennedy,   J.,   concurring);;   E.   Enter.   v.   Apfel,   524   U.S.   498,   539−40   (1998)  
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 113. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2606 (2010) (plurality opinion) (identifying problems “with using Substantive Due Process to do the 
work of the Takings Clause”).  Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed with the need 
to extend takings and emphasized that the “Court has long recognized that property regulations can be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause.”  Id. at  2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
 114. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883 n.15 (2012) (noting the claim in passing); Golan v. 
Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *17−18  (D.  Colo.  Apr.  20,  2005)  (granting  
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clauses will be considered here. 
To begin with, both clauses target the diminishment of property interests.115  
Many scholars have addressed the overarching question of the extent to which 
“intellectual property” should be characterized, both analytically and rhetorically, 
as a species of “property.”116  Among other things, they have considered how the 
theoretical justifications for property rights apply to intellectual property,117 
whether intellectual property rights are more appropriately enforced through 
property rules or through liability rules118 and how the digital era should shape any 
conception of intellectual property rights as a form of property rights.119  The very 
decision by a court to apply the Takings and Due Process Clauses to a state-
protected copyright or copyright-like interest could be viewed as a momentous 
conceptual move to entrench the treatment of intellectual property as property.  
 
the government summary judgment on the substantive due process claim).  For further discussion of this 
case, see infra Part V.F. 
 115. The property interests protected by each clause are not necessarily coextensive.  See, e.g., E. 
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); accord Merrill, supra note 111, at 
889 (“After College Savings Bank, one thing seems reasonably clear:  Parties seeking to protect an 
economic interest under the Due Process or Takings Clauses, whether advancing a procedural or a 
substantive claim, must be prepared to demonstrate that their interest is ‘property.’”); Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683,  1745−46  n.281  (1997);;  Olivia  
A. Radin, Note, Rights as Property, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 & n.23 (2004). 
 116. The literature is too vast to set forth comprehensively.  See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, 
COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 6−7   (2008)   (critiquing   conception   of   copyright   as   full-fledged Blackstonian 
property right); Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523, 524 
(2008) (arguing for copyright as privilege rather than property); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship 
and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.   873,   895−897   (1997)   (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, 
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS:  LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
(1996)) (contending that “the rhetoric and economic theory of real property are increasingly dominating 
the discourse and conclusions of the very different world of intellectual property”); Henry E. Smith, 
Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 
(2007) (“At the core of controversies over the correct scope of intellectual property lie grave doubts 
about whether intellectual property is property.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 290 
(1988) (arguing that “the labor and personality theories together exhaust the set of morally acceptable 
justifications of intellectual property”); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?  
The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 820–21 
(questioning whether patents and copyrights are “legitimate forms of property at all”) (1990); Alfred C. 
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:  Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 547 (1990) 
(calling for the development of a “natural law copyright jurisprudence”). 
 118. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 364 (2002) (“Although ‘intellectual property’ has long been compared to 
‘property,’ and ‘infringement of copyright’ compared to ‘trespass to realty,’ these analogies are 
problematic . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 
255−256   (2009)   (arguing   for   a   richer   analysis  of   the   “property-liability debate”); Mark A. Lemley & 
Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 
784−785  (2007)  (identifying  benefits  of  liability-based relief where injunctive relief cannot be narrowly 
tailored); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2655,  2664−67   (1994) (describing intellectual property disputes as largely compatible with a property 
rules framework). 
 119. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.  29,  42−43  (2005)  
(favoring retained, and evolving, notion of intellectual property rights as property rights). 
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While not intending to take a stance on the important, broader question of 
intellectual property as property vel non, we think it is likely that the Court would 
hold the interests at stake here to constitute property for purposes of the Due 
Process and Takings Clauses.120 
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court was faced with a takings 
claim that designated trade secrets as the relevant property interest.121  The Court 
accepted plaintiff Monsanto’s claim that the data it had submitted to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the requirements of the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) was property, in the form of a 
trade secret, under Missouri state law.122  As with trade secrets, pre-1972 copyright 
interests are assignable, can form the res of a trust, and pass to a trustee in 
bankruptcy.123  Later courts in other settings have also signaled that they view 
intellectual property rights, including copyrights, as property for purposes of 
Takings Clause protection.124 
In the present context, courts defining the property right in a pre-1972 sound 
recording would look to the applicable state law,125 since it is well established that 
 
 120. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999) (“The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property 
interests—notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’ of 
the owner because he can exclude others from using them.”); id. at 675 (noting that the “assets of a 
business (including its good will) unquestionably are property” within the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (determining that a patent is property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); accord Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) (“An 
interest in a copyright is a property right protected by the due process and just compensation clauses of 
the Constitution.”).  While the Court in College Savings Bank warned against the dangers of using unfair 
competition law to define constitutionally protected property interests, the state law interests at stake in 
our context manifest the approved-of hallmark of a right to exclude.  527  U.S.  at  673−74. 
 121. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.  986,  1000−01  (1984). 
 122. Id. at  1001−05   (1984).      In   addition,  while  disclaiming   the  necessity  of   doing   so,   the  Court  
found support for the “general perception of [trade secrets’] property-like nature” in Congress’ 
characterization of trade secrets in the legislative history.  Id. at 1002, 1003 n.8. 
 123. See id. at 1002 (limning characteristics of trade secrets that made them protectable property 
interests under state law and under the Takings Clause). 
 124. In a split decision, five Supreme Court Justices agreed that intellectual property is within the 
purview of the Takings Clause.  E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lane v. First Nat’l Bank 
of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that “a copyright is property” and suggesting that a 
Takings Clause claim might provide a remedy); Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) (“An 
interest in a copyright is a property right protected by the due process and just compensation clauses of 
the Constitution.”).  But see Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal:  Why Modern Courts 
Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. 
REV.   1,   5−6,   28−29   (2007)   (arguing   that   a   patent   is   a   federally   granted   benefit,   and   that   the  
categorization of a patent as “property” does not necessitate the protections of the Takings Clause). 
 125. For the purposes of this analysis, state law interests are referred to collectively as “state law 
copyrights,” even though many states protect published pre-1972 sound recordings through unfair 
competition and misappropriation causes of action rather than through a tort denominated “common law 
copyright.”  All of these state law claims have in common the right to exclude others from certain uses.  
However, the scope of the right holder’s interest varies.  See generally Jaszi Report, supra note 21, at 
9−22.  Accordingly, the claim to have property cognizable under the Constitution may be stronger in 
some states than in others. 
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“[p]roperty interests . . . . are created and their dimensions . . . defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”126  
Thus, a court might consider the law of the jurisdiction where the sound recording 
was recorded or where the right holder is located.127  Notably, even the uncertain or 
minimal economic value of the state law copyrights in older or more esoteric pre-
1972 sound recordings would not necessarily defeat a property-based claim.128  
Accordingly, the interests affected by a revocation of state law protections would 
likely constitute “property” for constitutional purposes.129  At the very least, since 
we cannot rule out that they would constitute property under the law of some state, 
we assume due process and takings protections would apply.130 
A.  FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Federalizing legislation for pre-1972 sound recordings falls easily under the 
heading of economic legislation.  It is well established that laws “adjusting the 
burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of 
constitutionality,” and that one complaining of a due process violation must 
“establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”131  
Moreover, such a legislative adjustment is “not unlawful solely because it upsets 
 
 126. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2612 (2010) (“The Takings Clause 
only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have been 
established or ought to have been established.”). 
 127. Recent case law reflects the difficulties inherent in identifying the situs of injury for purposes 
of personal jurisdiction in the Internet age.  See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 
159,  163−64  (N.Y.  2011);;  see also Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 128. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998) (“While the interest income at 
issue here may have no economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition 
are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property.”); id. at 172 (holding that the “interest income 
generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the principal”). 
 129. See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth 
Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV.   529,   566−67   (1998)   (arguing   similarly   in   the   case   of   copyrights,   but  
distinguishing “rights recognized under the federal law of unfair competition,” such as “the right to be 
free from dilution,” as more difficult to classify as property). 
 130. Clearly, if the Court were to decide otherwise, then no further constitutional analysis would 
be warranted.  In Dowling v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he copyright owner . . . 
holds no ordinary chattel,” and refused to deem bootlegged phonorecords “stolen” “goods” under 18 
U.S.C. § 2314.  473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985).  That case is distinguishable, however, on three grounds:  (1) 
the criminal nature of the statute drove the Court to apply a “narrow” construction of its reach; (2) the 
present concern is whether right holders have sufficient property-based interests under state law, not 
whether they own “goods” or “wares” and (3) in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Court did deem trade 
secrets as property protected under the Takings Clause.  467 U.S. 986, 1003−04  (1984).    Thus,  even  if  
the nature of copyright ownership is “distinct” from other forms of property ownership, Dowling, 473 
U.S. at 217, it is likely that stakeholders in this context would raise colorable claims of a deprivation of 
constitutionally protected property.  We thank Professor Irina Manta for helpful discussion on this point. 
 131. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,  348  U.S.  483,  487−88  (1955)). 
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otherwise settled expectations.”132  The Court long ago proclaimed that “[n]o 
person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall 
remain unchanged for his benefit.”133  Rather, the retroactive and prospective 
aspects of economic legislation simply must meet the due process requirement of 
“a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.”134  Demonstrating 
that they do not meet this requirement is a high burden, and courts are reluctant to 
find violations.135  Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to say that a “legislative 
determination provides all the process that is due.”136 
As a general proposition, it is indisputable that Congress legitimately may 
determine that the current patchwork of state law protections does not adequately 
“promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts”137 and that a unified federal 
scheme would better do so.  Indeed, as discussed above, Congress made that 
legislative determination when, in 1976, it federalized copyright protection—
without repercussions—for unpublished works that had already been created.138  
That aspect of the 1976 Copyright Act ended what had been perpetual protection 
for unpublished works.  The House Report concluded that this substitution of 
federal rights for state rights was “fully in harmony with the constitutional 
requirements of due process” as long as Congress provided a reasonable period of 
federal protection for those works.139  Likewise, the 1976 Act capped what had 
been perpetual protection for pre-1972 sound recordings, providing a hard end date 
(ultimately, 2067) for state law protections.140 
Both of these changes—each arguably more drastic than those currently under 
consideration, since they terminated what had been perpetual protection of works 
under state law—were enacted without legal challenge.  Thus, there is strong 
precedent for allowing Congress to amend the legislative scheme if it concludes, 
 
 132. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16. 
 133. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) (rejecting due process challenge to 
state workers’ compensation legislation that abrogated common law rules); cf. LON L. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW 53, 60 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing the “ossifi[cation]” of law that would occur if 
people were “secure[d] against any change in legal rules”). 
 134. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (considering a Michigan statute but 
invoking same principles as federal due process analysis); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (“[A] regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be 
so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 
R.A. Gray & Co.,  467  U.S.  717,  729−30  (1984)  (requiring  a  “showing that the retroactive application of 
the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose”). 
 135. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545 (“[W]e have long eschewed . . . heightened scrutiny when addressing 
substantive due process challenges to government regulation.”); accord Fisch, supra note 97, at 1074 
(noting that “the Court has not subjected retroactive legislation to close due process scrutiny,” only 
rational basis scrutiny).  But see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting “the 
possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process”). 
 136. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982). 
 137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; accord Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“The need for uniformity in the construction of patent law is 
undoubtedly important, [and] that is a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus . . . .”). 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012); see discussion supra Part I. 
 139. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 139 (1976). 
 140. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). 
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for example, that the patchwork scheme of state law protections makes users 
reluctant to engage in socially beneficial activities, such as preservation, 
scholarship and teaching.141  The devil, of course, is in the details, and it remains to 
be considered whether legislation addressing the most contentious areas identified 
above would pass muster. 
The Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead 
places a condition on the exercise of that power.”142  Thus, it is not designed to 
“limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a 
taking.”143  The purpose of this provision, the Court has said, is to prevent the 
government from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”144  The analysis 
turns on at least four considerations:  (1) whether the subject matter at issue is a 
protectable private property interest; (2) whether a taking of the property has 
occurred; (3) if a taking has occurred, whether it is for a public use; (4) whether just 
compensation has been provided.145  With respect to the first, as discussed above, It 
is assumed that courts would deem the property interests at stake to be 
constitutionally protected for these purposes.  It is also assumed that the third 
element, “public use,” would also be satisfied under the broad view taken by the 
Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of the New London.146 
 
 141. See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5; JUNE M. BESEK, COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED ISSUES RELEVANT TO DIGITAL PRESERVATION AND DISSEMINATION OF UNPUBLISHED PRE-
1972 SOUND RECORDINGS BY LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES (2009), available at http://www. 
clir.org/pubs/reports/pub144/pub144.pdf (surveying  state laws and exploring difficulties arising from 
non-uniform state law copyright protection); JUNE M. BESEK, COPYRIGHT ISSUES RELEVANT TO 
DIGITAL PRESERVATION AND DISSEMINATION OF PRE-1972 COMMERCIAL SOUND RECORDINGS BY 
LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES (2005), available at http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub135/pub135.pdf 
(same). 
 142. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. County, 482 U.S. 304, 314 
(1987); see also Brown  v.  Legal  Found.  of  Wash.,  538  U.S.  216,  231−32  (2003)  (“[T]he text of the Fifth 
Amendment imposes two conditions on the exercise of such authority:  the taking must be for a ‘public 
use’ and ‘just compensation’ must be paid to the owner.”). 
 143. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). 
 144. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 145. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000−01   (1984)   (applying   this   inquiry   to   a  
takings claim involving trade secrets). 
 146. Kelo  v.  City  of  New  London,  545  U.S.  469,  475,  479−80,  484−85   (2005).      In   that  case,  as  
part of an economic revitalization plan, the city of New London authorized a private nonprofit entity to 
acquire parcels of land from private owners by purchase or by exercising eminent domain in the name of 
the City.  Id. at 475.  In considering whether this forced transfer of property between private parties 
would satisfy a “public use,” the Court reiterated that there was no strict requirement that “condemned 
property be put into use for the general public.”  Id. at 479.  Rather, “public purpose” is the touchstone 
of the inquiry.  Id. at 480.  In light of the “comprehensive character of the plan” and “the thorough 
deliberation that preceded its adoption,” the Court evaluated the claims of the individual owners “not on 
a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan,” which, it determined, served a public purpose.  
Id. at 484.  In the case of sound recordings, there would likely not be, for the reasons explained above, a 
naked transfer of ownership of the pre-1972 state law copyrights to other private parties equivalent to 
that seen in Kelo.  The principal effect of federalization would be to eliminate the exclusive rights of 
current right holders ahead of schedule, with the goal of enhancing preservation and public access.  
Thus, federalizing legislation should satisfy the public use element of the takings analysis under Kelo.  
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Accordingly, the remainder of this Article will focus on the second question 
(whether a taking has occurred) and, to a lesser extent, the fourth question (whether 
just compensation has been provided). 
B.  FORESHORTENED TERM OF PROTECTION 
The most significant impact federalization is likely to have is on the term of 
protection.  As detailed above in Part III.B., the term of protection could be cut 
short for almost all published pre-1972 recordings, as well as for all unpublished 
recordings created prior to 1947.  With the proposed ninety-five-year term for 
published sound recordings (or 120 years for unpublished recordings), a sound 
recording published before 1923 could potentially lose anywhere from twenty-
seven years (if the extended term requirements are met) to forty-nine years of state 
law protection, assuming the effective date of federalizing legislation were January 
1, 2015.147  For those pre-1923 recordings, federalizing legislation would result in a 
loss of years of exclusivity—no matter what steps right holders undertook.  Many 
other pre-1972 sound recordings would also lose years of protection unless right 
holders met the extended term requirements.  This potential foreshortening of 
ownership for some categories of recordings, and the need to comply with the 
extended term requirements in others, could most predictably give rise to a 
cognizable claim. 
1.  Due Process 
The Due Process analysis is relatively straightforward and should not pose a 
significant problem for federalizing legislation.  Critically, the federalizing 
legislation would reflect a legitimate purpose:  to enhance the preservation of and 
access to early sound recordings.  It is in large measure the lack of parity in the 
treatment of early sound recordings and works created contemporaneously in other 
media that supports a legislative amendment.148  Specifically, works in other media 
copyrighted before 1978, and still under copyright, are entitled to a maximum of 
ninety-five years of copyright protection,149 and are subject to unfettered 
 
The fact that certain members of the public, such as librarians and archivists, might particularly wish to 
access these works should not defeat this analysis.  “Quite simply, the government’s pursuit of a public 
purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”  Id. at 485. 
 147. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, for example, United States v. Sperry Corp., 493  U.S.   52,   64−65   (1989),   in  which   the  
Court rejected a due process challenge to legislation that imposed a 1.5% deduction, in favor of the U.S. 
Treasury, from awards secured in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.  The appellee had obtained its 
award three months prior to the enactment of the statute, which had the effect of imposing a $42,000 fee 
on the appellee.  Id.  Nevertheless, the Court upheld the legislation because the retrospective legislation 
aimed at ensuring consistency whereby the “costs of a program [were] borne by the entire class of 
persons that Congress rationally believe[d] should bear them.”  Id. at 65.  Thus, successful Tribunal 
claimants, who had all benefited from its mechanisms, could justifiably be compelled to pay fees, 
regardless of whether they happened to secure their awards prior to or subsequent to the legislation.  Id. 
at  64−65. 
 149. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
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preservation efforts and public access at the conclusion of that term.  By contrast, 
almost no sound recordings are currently in the public domain throughout the 
country, nor are they likely to be so until 2067.150 
The comparison is particularly stark with respect to works published prior to 
1923.  For example, a musical composition published in 1922 would have become 
part of the public domain at the end of 1997;151 by contrast, a sound recording of 
the same vintage, which may be physically deteriorating and irreplaceable,152 will 
not enter the public domain until 2067—that is, seventy years later.  Through the 
federalizing legislation, Congress could put right holders of all categories of pre-
1978 works, including those of all pre-1978 sound recordings,153 on a more even 
footing with respect to the term of protection.  The arbitrary distinction between the 
legal treatment of pre- and post-February 15, 1972 sound recordings would largely 
disappear.154 
While the legislative fix comes many years after the initial legislation,155 it 
nonetheless is rationally related to the specified purpose.  The call for renewed 
Congressional attention to early sound recordings arose, in part, from a series of 
reports sponsored or commissioned by the National Recording Preservation Board 
between 2005 and 2010.156  The delay in ameliorative legislation would simply 
reflect a delay in the emergence of evidence that there was a problem. 
The rational relationship between the federalizing legislation and its purposes is 
further demonstrated by the narrow tailoring of its harshest elements:  the sole 
category of pre-1972 sound recordings that would never be eligible for an extended 
term until 2067 are those that were published before 1923; as described above, 
these extremely old recordings would only be eligible for an additional twenty-five 
years of protection.  However, all works in other media published before 1923 are 
already in the public domain.  Thus, the fact that the federalizing legislation 
confines its most demanding aspects to these earliest sound recordings—indeed, 
those which may be in most need of preservation—reflects rational tailoring.157 
 
 150. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 151. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 152. Id. at  56−58  (outlining  some  of  the  challenges  and  risks). 
 153. As mentioned, different treatment is accorded to certain foreign sound recordings.  See supra 
notes 32−37 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, right holders of sound recordings published before 
1923 would still enjoy a privileged position through compliance with the extended term requirements, 
since they could still obtain an additional twenty-five years of protection, whereas works in other media 
published before 1923 are in the public domain. 
 154. Accord United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994) (upholding a “curative” amendment 
to the federal tax code that retroactively closed a tax loophole fourteen months after the enactment of the 
original law, thereby depriving an estate of a deduction that would have reduced estate taxes by $2.5 
million). 
 155. It is true that the legislative fix implemented by federalizing legislation would be much 
further removed in time from the original legislation than in Sperry or Carlton.  See Fisch, supra note 
97, at 1074 (“In its opinion in Carlton, the Court suggested criteria for evaluating the rationality of 
retroactive legislation, including the remedial nature of the statute and the period of retroactive 
operation.”).  But the nature of the problem to be fixed was more immediately recognized in those 
settings than in the present context. 
 156. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (citing sources). 
 157. The Copyright Office recommended a maximum of twenty-five years of federal protection for 
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For these reasons, although the federalizing legislation might deprive certain 
right holders of the value of their state law copyrights for a portion of the current 
state law term, we think that federalizing legislation would not violate due process.  
While these right holders may have relied on the state law regime, even “[a]n 
entirely prospective change in the law may disturb the relied-upon expectations of 
individuals, but such a change would not be deemed to be therefore violative of due 
process.”158 
2.  Takings 
With respect to whether a taking has occurred, the Supreme Court has developed 
two categories of takings jurisprudence.  A taking in the classic sense is a “direct 
government appropriation or physical invasion of private property,”159 which 
imposes upon the government the “categorical duty to compensate the former 
owner.”160  The foreshortening of a copyright term is better analyzed under the 
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.161  The goals in applying this framework 
are to measure the “severity of the burden that government imposes upon private 
property rights,” and to assess whether the governmental action is “functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private 
property or ousts the owner from his domain.”162  The principal challenge 
undertaken in this Article is to convert the jurisprudence, which focuses on land 
rights and usage, to the present copyright-oriented context.163 
 
pre-1923 recordings in part because recordings from that era “are usually of such low quality that 
relatively few of them are marketable.”  COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 164. 
 158. Carlton,  512  U.S.  at  33−34. 
 159. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).  Such a transfer of property can be 
either to the government or to a private party.  See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2596 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“[C]lassic taking is a transfer of property 
to the State or to another private party by eminent domain . . . .”); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (assessing takings in the context of an economic revitalization plan under 
which private property would be transferred by eminent domain from one set of private parties to 
another). 
 160. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).  
In addition, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will [also] 
be recognized as a taking.”  Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  In determining how 
far is “too far,” courts must “remain cognizant that ‘government regulation by definition involves the 
adjustment of rights for the public good.’”  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (2005) (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)). 
 161. The frameworks used in the land-use exaction cases do not seem relevant here, as those cases 
involved land use permits and, in any event, no analogous conduct is implicated by the mere 
promulgation of federalizing legislation.  See Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 
2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987).  
 162. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
 163. An important subsidiary question is whether a regulatory takings claim would be framed as a 
facial or as applied challenge.  Claimants seeking to mount a facial challenge “face an uphill battle.”  
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 320 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)).  As the Court has formulated it, the test for a facial challenge 
is whether a statute, by its mere enactment, denies an owner of the economically viable use of his 
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a.  Per Se Taking 
A regulation through which the government requires a property owner to endure 
a permanent physical invasion of his property will effect a per se taking.164  A per 
se rule will also apply to a “total regulatory taking” that completely deprives a 
property owner of “all economically beneficial use[]” of the property.165  The latter 
two are “categories of regulatory action [that are] . . . compensable without case-
specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.”166 
In contrast to these “acquisitions of property for public use” are “regulations 
prohibiting private uses.”167  Such prohibitions require “complex factual 
assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.”168  This 
more common type of government regulation is evaluated by the standards outlined 
in the Penn Central balancing test.169  One significant difference between the 
categorical, per se approach and the ad hoc Penn Central approach is the degree of 
individualized factual development required to bring a successful claim.  Unlike the 
Penn Central framework, the per se framework would allow the court “to apply a 
clear rule.”170  The Supreme Court has explained that one reason for distinguishing 
between classic, categorical takings and Penn Central-type regulatory takings is 
that if courts were to treat all land-use regulations—which are ubiquitous and 
inevitably affect property values—as per se takings, that approach would 
“transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.”171  
“By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and 
usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.”172 
At first blush, there would seem to be a mismatch between a physically invasive 
regulatory taking and the act of extending federal copyright protection to intangible 
interests like state law copyrights.173  Such per se takings are typically tied to a 
 
property.  Id.  If a facial challenge fails, plaintiffs typically are able to bring an as applied challenge.  See 
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 164. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982)). 
 165. See Lucas   v.   S.C.   Coastal   Council,   505  U.S.   1003,   1019,   1026−30   (1992);;   accord United 
States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (“Since the governmental action here would result in 
a complete destruction of the property right of the secured party, the case fits but awkwardly into the 
analytic framework employed in Penn Central Transportation Co. . . . .”). 
 166. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 167. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978)). 
 170. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234 (2003) (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 
U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 171. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324. 
 172. Id. 
 173. We think that the other category of per se regulatory taking, under Lucas, ought not to apply 
here in light of Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331, which emphasizes the treatment of a parcel of property as 
a whole, rather than deprivations that were effectuated during any particular temporal segment, in 
determining which takings framework is applicable.  Under the federalizing legislation as conceived, 
there would not be a “total taking” of the entire state-protected copyright interest.  Id. at 331; accord 
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government intrusion upon a real property interest.  Nevertheless, there is precedent 
that would support such an approach.  In Brown v. Legal Foundation of 
Washington, the Supreme Court considered the appropriate framework through 
which to assess the compulsory transfer of interest accruing in so-called interest on 
lawyers’ trust accounts (IOLTAs).174  In an earlier case, the Court determined that 
the interest income earned by funds held in the IOLTA accounts was the “private 
property of the owner of the principal.”175  In Brown, the Court reasoned that 
something akin to a “permanent physical invasion” (and hence, taking) had 
occurred.176  Without explaining in any detail why the analogy was appropriate, the 
Court simply stated its conclusion that the transfer of IOLTA account interest from 
its owner to a public interest foundation, as required by state law, was a per se 
taking.177 
As discussed above, federalizing legislation should be drafted to ensure that, at 
the outset of the federal term, ownership of the federal copyright in pre-1972 sound 
recordings is determined according to the prior existing state law.178  Nevertheless, 
there would still remain the “naked” transfer of rights in the recording from the 
right holders to the public with respect to the truncated portion of the state law 
term.  Can it be said that federalizing legislation with this characteristic 
categorically “takes” that portion of the term?  The Court has contrasted per se 
takings with Penn Central-type regulatory takings, saying that the latter do “not 
give the government any right to use the property, nor [do they] dispossess the 
owner or affect her right to exclude others.”179  Arguably, by eliminating in some 
cases portions of the terms of the state law copyrights—which entitle the right 
holder to exclude others for many purposes—the federalizing legislation would 
tread close to this line of demarcation. 
Professor Thomas Cotter has addressed the question of which takings 
framework should be used to assess government uses of intellectual property.180  In 
particular, he draws upon two lines of precedent that may be compared to the 
 
Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) 
(“[A]nything short of a total deprivation must be decided under Penn Central . . . .”).  Furthermore, the 
Lucas Court itself suggested that its analysis was more applicable to real, rather than personal, property 
interests.    Lucas  v.  S.C.  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1027−28  (1992). 
 174. 538 U.S. 216 (2003); see also Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 
2600 (2013) (suggesting that “when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a 
specific, identifiable property interest such as a bank account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se 
[takings] approach’ is the proper mode of analysis”). 
 175. Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998). 
 176. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982)).  At issue in Loretto was a New York statute that required landlords to permit the 
installation of cable facilities on their rooftops and exteriors.  Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.  The Court held 
that permanent physical occupation of even a small portion of an owner’s parcel constituted a per se 
taking.  Id. at  426,  436−38. 
 177. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235.  The Court concluded, however, that no compensation was due 
because no pecuniary loss had been incurred by the property owners.  Id. at 240. 
 178. See discussion supra Part III.B.4. 
 179. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 n.19 
(2002). 
 180. See Cotter, supra note 129. 
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present inquiry into sound recordings.  First are cases in the patents area, where 
courts have struggled with the question of whether the government’s use of a 
patented invention without a license can constitute a compensable taking.181  The 
second is the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., which 
involved a challenge to a federal law allowing the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to use and publicly disclose trade secret-protected data that 
applicants for the registration of pesticides had submitted.182 
Noting the seeming contrast between the tradition of categorical compensation 
for patent owners and the Court’s application of an ad hoc approach in 
Ruckelshaus, Cotter argues that perhaps the categorical approach is preferable 
because uses by the government interfere with the “fundamental” property right of 
exclusion.183  Importantly, he suggests that “in some respects this right to exclude 
may be more fundamental in the context of intellectual property than it is in the 
context of real property.”184  His justification is that intellectual property rights 
typically confer on the right holder only negative rights to exclude others from 
engaging in certain acts, rather than affirmative rights to take those steps oneself.  
Thus, deprivation of the right to exclude eviscerates precisely what makes the 
property worth owning.185 
The present context should be distinguished, however.  First, as part of his 
analysis, Cotter attaches weight to the kind of “singling out” that occurs in the 
government uses he has identified.186  Thus, in the patent cases, the government 
was actively practicing the patented inventions without payment—in some cases, 
like defense weapons systems, where the government itself was likely to have been 
the only possible paying licensee for the patented invention.187  And, under the 
legislative regime scrutinized in Ruckelshaus, the authorized uses included the 
EPA’s use of the data to evaluate the applications of later pesticide registrants as 
long as the second comer offered to compensate the original submitter.188 
By contrast, the government is not seeking, through the federalizing legislation, 
to “use” or gain access to pre-1972 sound recordings.189  That is, the government 
 
 181. In protracted patent litigation, the Federal Circuit has wrestled with whether alleged patent 
infringement by the government could constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.  See Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States,  442  F.3d  1345,  1352−53  (Fed.  Cir.  2006)  (rejecting  argument  that  alleged  patent  infringement by 
government could be addressed as Fifth Amendment taking under Tucker Act), vacated by Zoltek Corp. 
v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 182. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984). 
 183. Kaiser Aetna v. United States,  444  U.S.  164,  179−80  (1979). 
 184. See Cotter, supra note 129, at 560. 
 185. See Ruckelshaus,   467   U.S.   at   1011−12;;   Adam  Mossoff,   Patents as Constitutional Private 
Property:  The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 720 
(2007) (describing the evolution from the nineteenth century conception of patent rights as use-rights to 
the contemporary twentieth century conception of them as exclusion rights). 
 186. See Cotter, supra note 129, at 562. 
 187. See id. at  539−42. 
 188. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 994. 
 189. That is, the federalizing legislation does not appear to be “conscript[ing]” property through 
seemingly “proscriptive” rules.  See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1080 (1993) (arguing 
that such activity lies at the heart of the takings analysis). 
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would not be “singling out” certain right holders so that the government (through 
federally operated libraries and archives) or the public could freely reproduce or 
distribute the recordings.  Rather, the contemplated legislation would be a 
legislative fix to ensure that a large category of works, pre-1972 sound recordings, 
is brought within the fold of a unified federal copyright system.  The legislation 
would aim to ensure that pre-1972 sound recordings do not retain preferable 
treatment to other works in a way that puts their very preservation and survival at 
risk.  It is for precisely these sorts of reasons that Professor Davida Isaacs 
forcefully argued against the extension of takings protections to patents:  concern 
that a proliferation of regulatory takings claims would lead the government to 
“hesitate to make socially valuable reforms [to patent law], thus injuring the 
public.”190 
Under Professor Cotter’s analysis, it is true that if the government’s use of a 
single patent is a categorical taking because it interferes with the exclusive rights of 
the patentee, then a fortiori, a generally applicable law that interferes with the 
exclusive rights of all sound recordings published before 1923 should be all the 
more subject to a categorical analysis.  But this ignores the fact that the federalizing 
legislation would not simply be taking away the final years of protection for the 
earliest pre-1972 sound recordings so as to make the term of protection more 
comparable to that enjoyed by works in other media of the same era.  Critically, 
during the minimum guaranteed federal term that would be granted to right holders 
in return, the federalizing legislation would also be guaranteeing certain valuable 
exclusive rights that may not exist under the laws of the several states, including a 
more certain derivative work right and public performance right in the case of 
digital audio transmissions.  In this sense, there is arguably implicit compensation 
to right holders within the federalizing legislation itself.191 
Accordingly, it is not accurate to describe the federalizing legislation solely as 
an “acquisition . . . of property for public use”192 requiring the per se treatment 
applied in Brown, where all IOLTA account interest was transferred away from 
every owner without any compensating benefits.  Here, some right holders may 
actually prefer the slate of federal rights to a longer, but less clear, term of state law 
protection.  Furthermore, even in Ruckelshaus, where the EPA was actively using 
the proprietary information at issue, the Court applied the Penn Central framework 
to legislation affecting trade secrets.193  Finally, given Congress’ unremarked upon 
pattern of bringing federal unity to copyrightable subject matter,194 and in particular 
 
 190. See Isaacs, supra note 124, at 3. 
 191. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 195−215   (1985);;   Thomas   W.   Merrill,   Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 121−22 (2002); see also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:  Why the Takings Issue 
Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 581−82 (1984). 
 192. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002). 
 193. Ruckelshaus,  467  U.S.  at  1005−06.    Professor  Cotter  points  out,  however,  that  the  Court  does  
use a kind of “per se” approach with respect to data the right holder submitted during one particular 
window of time because of the legislation’s effect on the right holder’s “reasonable investment-backed 
expectations” in submitting that data.  See Cotter supra note 129, at 561. 
 194. In another context in which congressional power to regulate the term of copyright protection 
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its prior withdrawal of perpetual protection for pre-1972 sound recordings and 
unpublished works in all media, the Penn Central balancing test—which would 
obligate a complaining stakeholder to prove certain kinds of economic reliance and 
harm—is more appropriate.195 
Even if a court were to apply a per se takings analysis, however, the lengthy 
period of state law protection already enjoyed by pre-1972 sound recordings is akin 
to an amortization period for nonconforming uses under zoning law, which some 
courts have found to vitiate takings claims.196 
b.  Penn Central Taking 
A reviewing court should instead apply the Penn Central regulatory takings 
factors.  Primary among these factors are “[t]he economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”197  Also relevant is the “character of 
the governmental action,” such as whether the interference amounts to a “physical 
invasion by government” rather than to “some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good”198 in a 
“manner that secures an ‘average reciprocity of advantage’ to everyone 
concerned.”199 
i.  “Economic Impact” 
Even if revocation of some period of state law protection were to reduce the 
value of copyright holders’ interests in their pre-1972 recordings, the Supreme 
Court in Penn Central rejected the notion that “diminution in property value, 
standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’”200  In that case, the Court considered the 
 
was challenged, the Court explicitly relied upon historical practice:  “To comprehend the scope of 
Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause, ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’”  Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) 
(Holmes, J.)).  The fact that Eldred dealt with expanded terms, rather than foreshortened terms, does not 
refute the importance of the history of congressional activity in this area. 
 195. Accord Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (citing Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (emphasizing that “most takings 
claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries” rather than on the application of bright line rules). 
 196. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV.  1222,  1244−45  (2009);;  Deepa  Varadarajan,  Note,  Billboards and Big Utilities:  Borrowing Land-
Use Concepts to Regulate “Nonconforming” Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 112 YALE L.J. 2553, 
2573−76  (2003). 
 197. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).  More recently, the Court has emphasized that “the magnitude or 
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights” and “how any 
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners” factor into the Penn Central inquiry.  Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). 
 200. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131; accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. 
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“[O]ur cases have long established that 
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application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central 
Terminal, pursuant to which the building’s owners (Penn Central) had been denied 
the right to construct an office tower atop the Terminal.201  In evaluating the impact 
of the landmarks law on the owners’ parcel, the Court found it significant that the 
landmark designation did not interfere with the primary uses to which the Terminal 
had been put for the prior sixty-five years, namely, a railroad terminal with office 
space and concessions.202  It remarked that, from the record before it, the law 
permitted “Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a 
‘reasonable return’ on its investment.”203 
Furthermore, the Court found other aspects of the regulatory regime mitigated 
the impact of the law’s restriction on Penn Central’s air rights.  It noted that even if 
Penn Central could not build the contemplated tower on the desired property, Penn 
Central’s pre-existing air rights had not been abrogated since they were transferable 
to other parcels that Penn Central owned in the vicinity of the Terminal, some of 
which were well suited for new office building construction.204  While the 
transferable development-rights program might not have been “ideal,” 
[t]he rights afforded [to Penn Central in this case] are valuable.  While these rights 
may well not have constituted “just compensation” if a “taking” had occurred, the 
rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has 
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering 
the impact of regulation.205 
Later cases underscore that any statutory provisions that “moderate and mitigate the 
economic impact” are relevant to this analysis.206 
Building on Penn Central, the Court has emphasized the treatment of a parcel of 
property as a whole, rather than deprivations that were effectuated during any 
particular temporal segment.207  In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court held that a thirty-two-month 
moratorium on virtually all development—that is, “all economically viable use”—
by property owners of their property was not a categorical taking but should be 
judged through the ad hoc, context-specific Penn Central framework,208 which 
“‘requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’”209  
 
mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”). 
 201. Penn Central,  438  U.S.  at  115−17. 
 202. Id. at 136. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 137. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Connolly v. Pension Benefit  Guar.  Corp.,  475  U.S.  211,  225−26  (1986). 
 207. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) 
(collecting cases); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a 
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated.”). 
 208. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,  535  U.S.  at  320−21.    Although  for  ease  of  language  we  refer  to  
one “moratorium,” in fact there were two moratoria, which together lasted thirty-two months.  Id. at 306. 
 209. Id. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
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Specifically, the Court stated that 
the District Court erred when it disaggregated petitioners’ property into temporal 
segments corresponding to the regulations at issue and then analyzed whether 
petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use during each period.210 
The Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Court was not, however, unanimous in 
this view,211 and that case is distinguishable from the present inquiry in significant 
ways.  In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Court noted that the temporary 
deprivation of use would be alleviated when the restriction—a moratorium 
intended to arrive at a comprehensive plan for use of the land—ended.212  
Furthermore, the reason for the moratorium was to “maintain the status quo while 
studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and designing a strategy for 
environmentally sound growth.”213  Thus, one could expect that despite, or even 
because of, the moratorium on development, property values would actually rise, to 
the ultimate benefit of the affected property owners, “reflect[ing] the added 
assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain in its pristine state.”214  The Court conceded 
that “[i]t may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year 
should be viewed with special skepticism,” but it said that the thirty-two months 
required was “not unreasonable” and that “we could not possibly conclude that 
every delay of over one year is constitutionally unacceptable.”215 
By contrast, in the case of pre-1972 sound recordings, any suspension in a state 
copyright holder’s exclusive use would arise in connection with an irreversible 
termination of state law rights.  It is also difficult to argue that the foreshortening of 
the state law term of its own accord would ultimately inure to the benefit of those 
right holders.  (Although, as previously underscored, the federalizing legislation 
would secure for right holders a set of exclusive federal rights in return.)  
Furthermore, as described above, the elimination of the number of years of 
protection could far exceed the two to three years of use at issue in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council. 
Although the Court’s cautioning against the employment of temporal segments 
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council addressed the discrete question of which 
takings framework is applicable, its analysis is also relevant to the measurement of 
the economic impact of the federalizing legislation on right holders.  The economic 
impact of the legislation should be measured against the value of the entire life of 
the rights in the pre-1972 sound recording. 
 
 210. Id. at 331 (citation omitted). 
 211. In his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued against the notion that a 
regulatory taking must be judged in relation to the “parcel as a whole.”  Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  He argued that “a regulation effecting a total deprivation of the use of a so-called ‘temporal 
slice’ of property is compensable under the Takings Clause unless background principles of state 
property law prevent it from being deemed a taking . . . .”  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, 
this was not the position of the majority. 
 212. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 332. 
 213. Id. at 306. 
 214. Id. at 341. 
 215. Id. at 341–42. 
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Perhaps the strongest case law that would counsel against the finding of a taking 
in the context of federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings is Andrus v. Allard.216  
Decided just one year after Penn Central, the Court in Andrus noted the fact that 
the regulations at issue, which prevented the sale of parts of birds legally killed 
before the birds became subject to statutory protection, did not require the parts be 
surrendered, nor did it entail physical invasion or restraint of them.217  Thus, 
although one means of disposing them had been significantly impaired (i.e., by 
sale), the “denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a 
taking.  At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the 
destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must 
be viewed in its entirety.”218  And in this case, it was “crucial that appellees 
retain[ed] the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise 
the protected birds.”219  Thus, it was not clear that “appellees [would] be unable to 
derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the 
artifacts for an admissions charge.  At any rate, loss of future profits—
unaccompanied by any physical property restriction—provides a slender reed upon 
which to rest a takings claim.”220 
If the current Court were to apply this reasoning, it would seem at the very least 
to require direct evidence of economic impact from current copyright holders rather 
than vague claims about lost value pertaining to the portion of the state copyright 
term that is forfeited under federalization.221 
ii.  “Distinct investment-backed expectations” 
Investment decisions and contractual arrangements have likely been built around 
a state law based framework for protection.  Such protection for pre-1972 sound 
recordings has long been in place and the 1976 Act arguably buttressed the 
expectation of uninterrupted state law protection of those recordings until the 
middle of the twenty-first century.222  Thus, one argument is that not only have 
investment-backed expectations been in place for decades, but such expectations 
were also reaffirmed by the significant overhaul of the copyright system that 
occurred in 1976. 
 
 216. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
 217. Id. at 65. 
 218. Id. at 65−66. 
 219. Id. at 66. 
 220. Id.  
 221. By way of comparison to concrete figures, in Hodel v. Irving, the Court suggested that while 
loss of $100 might be inconsequential, the value of the other interests at issue in the case, which would 
escheat on account of the legislation, were $2,700 and $1,816—“‘not trivial sums.”  Hodel v. Irving, 481 
U.S. 704, 714 (1987).  In Eastern Enterprises, the Court found the payments required of the petitioner 
under the Coal Act of $50 million to $100 million to be a “considerable financial burden.”  Eastern 
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529 (1998) (plurality opinion). 
 222. Federal preemption of state laws protecting sound recordings was initially set to occur on 
February 15, 2047; with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998), the date was extended by twenty years, until February 15, 2067. 
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Nevertheless, as explained above, copyright law more generally has been the 
subject of legislative revision.223  The 1976 Act changed the framework for 
protection, across media, of unpublished works.224  With respect to pre-1972 sound 
recordings in particular, the 1976 Act revoked what had been perpetual state law 
protection for these recordings.  Thus, expectations of such changes from time to 
time arguably are now built into the fabric of these property rights.225  By itself, 
however, the pattern of frequent amendment of the copyright statute would not 
automatically weigh against a takings claim.  That is, the mere fact that holders of 
copyright interests in pre-1972 sound recordings might be deemed to have notice of 
the frequent changes in federal copyright law would not necessarily prevent a 
takings claim.  In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, for example, the Supreme Court held 
that the fact that the property owner had acquired the land at issue with notice of 
regulations restricting use did not foreclose a takings claim.226  Thus, even those 
copyright holders who had acquired their interests in recent years, with additional 
knowledge of the frequency with which the law has been amended, might not be 
defeated by this factor.  Nevertheless, the reasonableness of expectations in the 
context of the regulatory scheme is a factor to be considered.227  The Court has 
made clear that those “who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the 
legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the 
legislative end.”228 
Furthermore, the presence or absence of an “average reciprocity of advantage” 
from the legislative change is also relevant.  In Hodel v. Irving, for example, the 
statute at issue required that certain undivided fractional interests in land owned by 
Native Americans would escheat, upon the death of the owner, to his or her tribe.229  
Three members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe brought suit challenging the statute.  The 
Supreme Court noted that many members of the Tribe whose fractional interests 
 
 223. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft,  537  U.S.  186,  194−96  (2003). 
 224. Of course, with respect to works that a creator never plans to publish, it is unlikely that 
investment-backed expectations are significant. 
 225. See Isaacs, supra note 124, at 28 (noting that “it is unclear how the courts would apply the 
concept of ‘background principles’ to patents”). 
 226. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (noting that “[a] blanket rule that 
purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument 
to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken,” and remanding for application of Penn Central 
factors); see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 34 n.5, 37 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(describing the Palazzolo holding as “whether property is acquired before or after a regulation is enacted 
does not completely determine the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations”); Abbott Labs. 
v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 290 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 227. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]nterference with investment-
backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.  Further, the regulatory 
regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness 
of those expectations.”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 228. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 
602, 645 (1993) (citation omitted).  Moreover, the “fact that legislation disregards or destroys existing 
contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an illegal taking”; rather, “[i]f the 
regulatory statute is otherwise within the powers of Congress . . . its application may not be defeated by 
private contractual provisions.”  Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986). 
 229. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 709 (1987). 
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would escheat would actually benefit from the escheat of the interests of other 
members of the Tribe.230  Accordingly, it determined that this “average reciprocity 
of advantage” would weigh “weakly” in favor of the statute.  Could an equivalent 
tradeoff exist for sound recording copyright owners to the extent that they get 
equivalent rights that make up for the loss of years of protection? 
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, a plurality of the Court determined that 
reasonable investment-backed expectations favored the party challenging the 
statute.231  In that case, petitioner Eastern Enterprises would have been liable under 
the Coal Act for lifetime medical benefits for employees who had worked for the 
company thirty to fifty years before the statute was enacted, a liability which was 
expected to total between $50 million and $100 million.232  This liability was 
imposed “without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern accepted under any 
benefit plan the company itself adopted.”233  The Court determined that the 
premiums for which Eastern would now be liable were “not calibrated either to 
Eastern’s past actions or to any agreement—implicit or otherwise—by the 
company.  Nor would the pattern of the Federal Government’s involvement in the 
coal industry have given Eastern ‘sufficient notice’ that lifetime health benefits 
might be guaranteed to retirees several decades later.”234  Assessing the Penn 
Central factors, the Court found the statute to effect a “severe, disproportionate, 
and extremely retroactive burden on Eastern,“ which violated the Takings Clause as 
applied to Eastern.235 
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court examined a takings claim with 
respect to trade secrets.236  During the time frame in which the Court found a 
potential taking, Monsanto had submitted its health, safety and environmental data 
to the EPA under a statutory assurance of confidentiality and exclusive use.237  The 
Court characterized the “right to exclude others” as “central to the very definition 
of the property interest” at stake when it comes to trade secrets, for once they are 
disclosed or others are allowed to use them, “the holder of the trade secret has lost 
his property interest in the data.”238 
At the Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting in June 2011, it was 
suggested that this concern might not carry the same weight with respect to sound 
recordings.239  This is so because those who hold the masters or otherwise have a 
lead-time advantage can still monetize their recordings even should they fall into 
the public domain.  Nevertheless, it is not clear how much purchase such an 
 
 230. Id. at  715−16. 
 231. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529 (1998) (plurality opinion). 
 232. Id. at 531. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 536. 
 235. Id. at 538. 
 236. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 237. Id. at 1011. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Eric Harbeson, Music Library Ass’n, Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public 
Meeting 19 (June 2, 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/transcript-06-02-
2011.pdf. 
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argument should have, since a similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Ruckelshaus: 
That the data retain usefulness for Monsanto even after they are disclosed—for 
example, as bases from which to develop new products or refine old products, as 
marketing and advertising tools, or as information necessary to obtain registration in 
foreign countries—is irrelevant to the determination of the economic impact of the 
EPA action on Monsanto’s property right.  The economic value of that property right 
lies in the competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its 
exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy 
that competitive edge.240 
Critically, the Court rejected EPA’s argument in favor of uniformity in the form of 
a “comprehensive FIFRA registration scheme”—even more important in view of 
its tie to public health and safety than copyright legislation—to displace the 
vagaries of state law.241 
iii.  “Character of the Governmental Action” 
Under this prong of the Penn Central analysis, courts consider whether the 
government “physically invade[s] or permanently appropriate[s]” property, or 
whether it is creating “a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.”242  They also consider whether the 
government is “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”243  With respect to 
the latter consideration, is a shift from state to federal protection likely to entail a 
“singling out” of current state law interest holders?  If so, the character of the 
governmental action might weigh in favor of a taking.244 
If the character of the action is to abrogate a fundamental property right, such as 
the “right to exclude others,”245 or the right to devise property to one’s heirs,246 
such an action is likely to weigh in favor of a taking.  With respect to the latter, the 
Court in Hodel decided that the ability to control the disposition of property upon 
death through “complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts” was not 
 
 240. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1012. 
 241. Id. (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)) (other 
citations omitted).  The Court refrained from definitively finding a takings problem at this stage, since it 
was possible that the negotiation and arbitration provisions of the statute might have resulted in “just 
compensation to Monsanto for the loss in the market value of its trade-secret data.”  Id. at 1013. 
 242. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986). 
 243. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 244. See Cienega Gardens v. United States,  331  F.3d  1319,   1338−39   (Fed.  Cir.  2003).     But see 
Davidson, supra note 173, at 4 (challenging the emerging equality dimension in regulatory takings 
analysis). 
 245. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 246. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,  716−717  (1987)  (noting  the  extraordinary  character  
of the action at issue:  virtual abrogation of “the right to pass on a certain type of property—the small 
undivided interest—to one’s heirs” in light of the fact that such a right “has been part of the Anglo-
American legal system since feudal times”). 
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an adequate substitute for the rights taken.247  Likewise, as mentioned above, the 
property interests at stake in Hodel were not de minimis.248  Both of these features 
further persuaded the Court that the character of the government action in 
abrogating an “essential” right was “extraordinary.”249 
It is hard to know exactly how to apply these precedents to pre-1972 sound 
recordings.  Together, they suggest that if the value of the pre-1972 sound 
recording copyrights were de minimis, the character of the government action 
might not weigh in favor of a taking.  Since, however, it is unlikely that copyright 
with only de minimis value would be the subject of a constitutional challenge 
because it is doubtful that anyone would expend the funds to litigate, it is not clear 
that this tells us much.  The other lesson appears to be that if roughly equivalent 
rights are substituted in place of the pre-1972 sound recording interests, that 
substitution might ameliorate the character of the government action.250  Certainly, 
if the earlier case Andrus v. Allard had continuing force, the “denial of one 
traditional property right does not always amount to a taking,”251 and would not 
where “appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to 
donate or devise the protected birds.”252 
C.  FILING OBLIGATIONS AND THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE THE WORK 
REASONABLY AVAILABLE 
The proposed federalizing legislation requires that right holders of pre-1972 
sound recordings take certain steps in order to preserve their rights to those 
recordings.  Specifically, as mentioned, holders of published post-1923 recordings 
(and never-published recordings) would have to:  (1) make, and continue to make, 
the recordings available to the public at a reasonable price and (2) file a notice with 
the Copyright Office confirming the availability of the recordings at a reasonable 
price, as well as that the owner intends to preserve his or her copyright protection 
until 2067.253  For recordings published before 1923, similar steps are required, 
except that the protection may extend only as long as twenty-five years.254  
Complying with these requirements may well entail some degree of financial 
hardship. 
 
 247. Id. at 716. 
 248. Id. at 717. 
 249. Id. at 716–17. 
 250. See Henry Lee Mann, As Our Heritage Crumbles into Dust:  The Threat of State Law 
Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 6 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 45, 52 (2006) (noting 
that “the drawback of the temporal limitation [on copyright holders] would be at least partially offset by 
the benefit of uniform and predictable protection, as is currently enjoyed by post-1972 sound 
recordings”); see also Erlinger, supra note 68,   at   73−74   (grappling   with   trade-offs and stating that 
“[w]here the term of federal protection provided is significantly less than the term of state protection 
lost, the replacement begins to look more like a taking and less like an equitable tradeoff”). 
 251. Andrus v. Allard,  444  U.S.  51,  65−66  (1979). 
 252. Id. at 66. 
 253. See supra text  accompanying  notes  45−46. 
 254. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
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The Supreme Court’s decisions in Texaco, Inc. v. Short255 and United States v. 
Locke256 strongly indicate that these steps required to preserve ownership are 
constitutionally permissible.  In Texaco, the Court considered an Indiana statute 
providing that segregated mineral interests not used for twenty years would 
automatically lapse and pass to the surface owner of the land, unless the mineral 
rights owner filed a statement with the county recording office within a two-year 
grace period.257  “Use” was defined to include mineral production, or the payment 
of rents, royalties or taxes.258  The purpose of this legislative provision was to 
extinguish “stale and abandoned” interests that impeded the public interest in the 
development of mineral and surface rights.259 
In consolidated cases that arose over the ownership of certain mineral interests 
claimed to have lapsed, the Court held that the statute was constitutional.  As an 
initial matter, the Court stated broadly that 
[w]e have no doubt that, just as a state may create a property interest that is entitled to 
constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition the permanent retention 
of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a 
present intention to retain the interest.260 
The Court described the required filing of a statement of claim, in the absence of 
use, to be a “slight burden” on the mineral interest owners while providing “such 
clear benefits” to the public by identifying the owners of the interests from whom 
developers could acquire operating rights and the county could collect taxes.261  In 
Locke, the Court upheld an analogous federal scheme requiring holders of 
unpatented mining interests to make certain filings in order to preserve their 
interests.262  The purposes of the filings in that scheme were to eradicate stale 
mining claims and allow federal officials to make informed land management 
decisions.263  In both of these cases, the Court cited a long tradition of upholding 
legislation that required property owners to take affirmative steps in order to retain 
 
 255. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
 256. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
 257. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518. 
 258. Id. at 519. 
 259. Id. at 523. 
 260. Id. at 526; accord Locke, 471 U.S. at 104 (“Even with respect to vested property rights, a 
legislature generally has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way in which those 
rights are used, or to condition their continued retention on performance of certain affirmative duties.  
As long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed to further legitimate 
legislative objectives, the legislature acts within its powers in imposing such new constraints or 
duties.”). 
 261. Texaco, 454  U.S.  at  529−30. 
 262. Locke, 471 U.S. at 109. 
 263. Id. at 87.  The Court did emphasize that unpatented mining claims are a “unique form of 
property” over which the government retains “substantial regulatory power.”  Id. at  104−05.    However,  
its general statements about the right of government to condition the retention of property interests were 
just as broad as those in Texaco.  And, in any event, given the history of reform of the copyright statute, 
one might say that copyright interests, too, remain subject to “substantial regulatory power.” 
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their rights.264 
It is thus worth noting at the outset that such precedent also exists in the 
copyright context.  The URAA’s copyright restoration provisions, which have now 
been upheld by the Supreme Court, require right holders of “restored” copyrights in 
certain foreign works to file a notice of intent to enforce those rights against 
reliance parties—that is, against third parties who had been making use of the 
works.265  The notices can be filed either with the Copyright Office or directly on 
the reliance parties.266  While the Supreme Court did not directly pass on the 
takings or due process aspects of the requirement of filing these notices, their 
inclusion in the applicable statutory scheme reflects precedent for the sort of 
requirement being contemplated here. 
Also permeating the Court’s analyses in Texaco and Locke were undercurrents 
of the responsibilities of property ownership and the ability of government officials 
to identify those owners.  In Texaco, there was demonstrated “neglect”—a failure 
of property owners to make productive “use” of the mineral rights, including the 
payment of taxes.267  In Locke, more than six million unpatented mining claims 
existed on public lands, many of which were “dormant for decades” and impeded 
the government’s ability to take any action regarding federal lands.268 
In the case of pre-1972 sound recordings, the animating purposes of the 
federalizing legislation would reflect such a lack of stewardship.  The legislation is 
aimed, in part, to ameliorate a widespread failure to preserve fragile, decaying 
sound recordings.269  Many copyright owners of older recordings simply are not in 
a position to preserve them and to make them available to the public.270  Simply 
put, the filing requirements would enable libraries and archives to preserve old 
recordings that have been abandoned.  As in Texaco and Locke, the requirement of 
filing a notice to indicate an intention to retain the extended term of protection 
would be a strong indication that the interests have not been abandoned. 
If the Public Meeting on Pre-1972 Sound Recordings was any indication, 
however, some opposition to the federalizing legislation may come from right 
holders of sound recordings that are in wide circulation and have been well 
preserved.271  Such parties might argue that any concerns about abandonment 
simply do not apply to their own well-known, economically valuable recordings.  
But the point of the filing requirements is precisely to address this problem by 
 
 264. Id. at  103−04;;  Texaco, 454  U.S.  at  526−29. 
 265. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c), (e) (2012); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883 (2012). 
 266. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c), (e). 
 267. Texaco, 454  U.S.  at  529−30. 
 268. Locke, 471 U.S. at 86−87. 
 269. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 5, at 90. 
 270. See id. at 60. 
 271. See U.S. Copyright Office, Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting (June 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/transcript-06-02-2011.pdf; see also 
Comments of Recording Industry Ass’n of America (RIAA) and American Ass’n of Independent Music 
(A2IM) 7,   9−15 (Nov. 3, 2010), in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS REGARDING FEDERAL 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS FIXED BEFORE FEB. 15, 1972, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/comments/initial. 
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separating the wheat from the chaff—that is, separating the well-tended-to 
recordings from those that have been effectively abandoned.  Many of the valuable 
rights are held by corporate entities which presumably have adequate records as to 
the recordings whose terms they would like to extend until 2067.  They would thus 
be able to comply with the federalizing legislation. 
Right holders with large catalogs may argue in response that the sheer number 
of filings they would have to make far surpasses what the Court characterized as a 
“slight burden” in Texaco.272  To address this problem, any statutory amendments 
and implementing regulations should streamline the filing process for right holders.  
In any event, the Court should give wide berth to the kinds of requirements that 
Congress imposes.  In Locke, the imposition of both an initial and an annual filing 
requirement relating to already-existing property interests passed constitutional 
muster because the means were rational to support “clearly legitimate” legislative 
purposes.273  This was true even though, had every interest holder participated, the 
statute would potentially have required filings with respect to more than six million 
mining interests. 
The Court’s specific due process and takings pronouncements on these 
requirements will be briefly considered.  With respect to generally applicable laws 
that alter substantive rights, constitutionally adequate process usually consists of 
“enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the extent the statute regulates private 
conduct, affording those within the statute’s reach a reasonable opportunity both to 
familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with 
those requirements.”274  The federalizing legislation would provide for a transition 
period in which a right holder would need to take certain steps to secure the 
maximum available extended term of protection.  During that transition period, the 
right holder would need to make the work available to the public at a reasonable 
price and file a one-time notice verifying the work’s availability and stating intent 
to achieve protection for the applicable extended term.275 
This sort of transition period, in which property owners must take certain steps 
and file certain notices to preserve their interests, fits comfortably within the 
requirements of due process.  In Texaco and Locke, for example, the Supreme 
Court approved both two- and three-year grace periods in which to make filings 
required to preclude deemed abandonment of the property interests at stake.276  
Accordingly, as long as the federalizing legislation spells out the nature of the 
required notice and the definition of what it meant to make a work available at a 
 
 272. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530. 
 273. Locke, 471  U.S.  at  105−06.    Holders  of  unpatented  mining  interests  had  to  file  both  an  initial  
claim with respect to the physical location of their interests and, annually thereafter, a notice of intention 
to hold the claim, an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim or a detailed reporting form, 
or else they would face abandonment of the interest.  Id. at  88−89.    Technically,  it  was  the  annual  filing  
requirement that gave rise to the dispute on appeal.  Id. 
 274. Id. at 108. 
 275. Under the federalizing legislation as currently formulated, the transition period is three years 
for sound recordings published before 1923, and six years for those published after 1923 or never 
published at all.  See supra Part II. 
 276. Locke, 471 U.S. at 108; Texaco, 454  U.S.  at  532−33. 
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reasonable price, due process will be satisfied. 
With respect to takings, the Court in Texaco held that the Takings Clause does 
not require compensation of an owner “for the consequences of his own 
neglect.”277  Under the applicable statute there, interests that were not used for 
twenty years and for which no claims were filed were deemed abandoned, and it 
was “the owner’s failure to make any use of the property—and not the action of the 
State—that cause[d] the lapse of the property right.”278  Thus, the deprivation of 
these abandoned interests was not a taking.  Nor was the requirement that a mineral 
interest holder come forward and file a claim, if he wanted to preserve the interest, 
itself a “taking.”279 
In contrast to Texaco, the federalizing legislation would not preserve state law 
copyright interests based solely on the use of those recordings.  So, for example, it 
would not be sufficient for a right holder to point to the wide circulation and sales 
of Elvis Presley and Ella Fitzgerald tracks to secure an extended federal term of 
protection until 2067.  Rather, as stated, all right holders would have to make 
certain filings to secure the extended federal term, no matter how widely available 
their recordings.  Nevertheless, this was exactly the set-up in Locke, which required 
filings—not just use—by all property owners who wished to retain their 
interests.280  The Court in Locke relied on Texaco to conclude that any property 
deprivation was based on the right holders’ failure to comply with the “minimal 
burden” of annually filing the requisite documentation.281  Thus, the forfeiture of 
their rights was not a taking.282 
D.  REGISTRATION 
Right holders of pre-1972 sound recordings would have to expend funds to 
register their recordings with the Copyright Office in order to qualify for statutory 
damages or to bring an action if the recording is a U.S. work.283  As of May 1, 
2014, registration fees are set at $55 for an online registration and $85 for a paper 
registration per work.284  These fees are required for all new works sought to be 
registered, and thus right holders of pre-1972 sound recordings would simply be 
placed in the same position as all other creators and owners.  If followed, the Ninth 
 
 277. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See Locke, 471 U.S. at 106. 
 281. “Finally, the restriction attached to the continued retention of a mining claim imposes the 
most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must simply file a paper once a year indicating that the 
required assessment work has been performed or that they intend to hold the claim.”  Id. 
 282. See id. at 107 (“Regulation of property rights does not ‘take’ private property when an 
individual’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long as he 
complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the legislature has imposed.”). 
 283. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (2012) (delineating registration as a prerequisite for these 
purposes in the case of works in other media). 
 284. See Copyright Office Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/sl04_2014. 
pdf. 
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Circuit’s reasoning in Ladd v. Law & Technology Press would seem to foreclose a 
takings claim on this ground.285  Citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Ladd 
court said that “Congress indubitably can place conditions on the grant of a 
statutory benefit.”286  In deflecting challenges by the copyright holder that the 
deposit requirement is not a valid condition, the Ninth Circuit said that 
“[c]onditioning copyrights on a contribution to the Library of Congress furthers 
th[e] overall purpose” of the Copyright Clause.287  Even though deposit is not a 
precondition to copyright under the 1976 Act, it is still a requirement, and thus 
“precedent on statutory conditions,” such as Ruckelshaus, is still applicable.288  
Another option to consider, of course, is to modify the registration requirements for 
newly federalized pre-1972 sound recordings.289 
E.  SUBSTITUTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
It is clear that the federalizing legislation contemplates not just a quantitative 
shift, but also a qualitative shift in the rights and remedies state copyright holders 
would enjoy and in users’ defenses thereto.  Federal rights and defenses would be 
put in place of state rights and defenses; federal remedies would replace state 
remedies.  As discussed, with respect to rights, the federal regime generally offers 
right holders more—most prominently, an established derivative work right and 
public performance right (the latter with respect to digital audio transmissions).  
These rights, and others, would of course be subject to the same important 
exceptions and limitations that apply to uses of other works, such as fair use.  With 
respect to remedies, although both systems allow for actual damages, the federal 
system would replace the possibility of punitive damages with the possibility of 
statutory damages beyond what is necessary to compensate the right holder.290 
Therefore, the property right at stake in this context might be framed in a 
different way from those posited in the prior sections.  Specifically, stakeholders 
might claim vested interests in a particular bundle of exclusive rights available 
under state law, or in a particular set of remedies.  Accordingly, the Article next 
considers the due process and takings implications of claims framed in this way. 
If, as hypothesized, the federalizing legislation were to become effective on 
January 1, 2015, many scenarios are imaginable; three will be addressed.  First, 
parties might already be engaged in litigation on that date.  For example, Party A 
might have sued Party B for making and distributing unauthorized copies of a 
 
 285. Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 286. Id. at 813 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)). 
 287. Id. at 814; cf. Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that 
Congress has wide constitutional latitude to impose patent application and issuance fees). 
 288. Ladd, 762 F.2d at 814.  Ladd also distinguished a line of cases limiting the federal 
government’s ability, when acting in a proprietary rather than sovereign capacity, to appropriate 
patented devices.  Id. at  814−15. 
 289. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2012) (waiving registration requirement for copyright litigation 
involving non-U.S. works). 
 290. Federal copyright law also explicitly provides for non-monetary relief in the form of 
injunctions and impounding.  17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503 (2012). 
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sound recording fixed in 1965.  The Supreme Court has held that a cause of action 
may be considered property protectable under the Due Process Clause.291  Where 
there is pending litigation, therefore, the case should be adjudicated under the 
preexisting state law.292  Such an application of state law would mean, for example, 
that punitive damages should remain available to Party A, but that Party A could 
not amend its complaint to claim a violation of a derivative work right (assuming 
such a right did not exist under state law).293  It would also mean that Party B could 
defend only on the basis of pre-existing state law defenses, which may or may not 
include fair use or other defenses. 
A second scenario is that some time prior to January 1, 2015, Party C made 
unauthorized reproductions and distributions of sound recordings to which Party D 
holds rights.  Let’s assume that, also prior to January 1, 2015, Party D knew of 
Party C’s activities and hired a lawyer to sue Party C, but that Party D did not 
actually file suit until January 1, 2016.  In such a case, the cause of action has 
accrued before the effective date of legislation.  Here, too, the best course of action 
to avoid due process problems is to adjudicate the case under state law, with the 
implications described above. 
Both of these scenarios could be accomplished by modeling the federalizing 
legislation on the current § 301(b)(2) to remove from federal preemption the state 
law rights and remedies pertaining to “any cause of action arising from 
undertakings commenced before [its effective date].”294  In general, the reference to 
 
 291. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (citing Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)) (noting that “a cause of action is a species of property 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”). 
 292. As long as Congress was clear as to the temporal application of the federalizing legislation, 
see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511  U.S.  244,  267−68  (1994),  it  is  not  entirely  clear  that  application  of  
the new (federal) law to such cases—even to the point of extinguishing pending state law claims in favor 
of federal claims—would necessarily pose a due process problem.  See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 
F.3d  1126,  1140−41   (9th  Cir.  2009)  (rejecting  substantive  due  process  challenge   to   federal   legislation  
that preempted state tort law claims in pending cases); cf. Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 835 F.2d 
1369, 1374 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying state supreme court decision to pending cases that had the effect 
of extinguishing plaintiffs’ tort-based causes of action). 
  In Hammond v. United States, the plaintiff claimed that “the filing of a suit on an accrued 
common-law or state statutory cause of action gives her a vested property right in that action, and that 
Congress cannot retroactively abolish that cause of action and legislate the dismissal of plaintiff’s suit 
without violating due process.” 786 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1986).  The court rejected the due process 
challenge.  Id. at 10−11.  First, it determined that “[b]ecause rights in tort do not vest until there is a 
final, unreviewable judgment, Congress abridged no vested rights of the plaintiff by enacting [the 
statutory provision] and retroactively abolishing her cause of action in tort.”  Id. at 12.  In any event, the 
statute passed rational basis scrutiny.  Id. at  13−14;;  accord Ileto  v.  Glock,  Inc.,  565  F.3d  1126,  1140−41  
(9th Cir. 2009).  But see Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1148 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Logan, 455 U.S. at 428, to conclude that a “pending cause of action, therefore, 
may be more or less valuable at various points during its pendency, but, even before it is reduced to a 
final dollar amount, it is a ‘species of property protected by the . . . Due Process Clause’”). 
 293. Any prospective injunctive relief obtained under state law would need to expire at termination 
of new federal term. 
 294. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2) (2012); see also § 301(c)(2) (“With respect to sound recordings fixed 
before [its effective date], any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not 
be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067.”). 
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“undertakings commenced” has been interpreted to mean “infringement[s] taking 
place.”295  Even clearer language, however, could be chosen to solidify the point. 
A third scenario is as follows:  After January 1, 2015, Party E makes 
unauthorized reproductions and distributions of Party F’s recordings.  At this point, 
federal law would apply to the case of Party F v. Party E, and it seems clear that 
the application of federal law would comport with due process.296  Conceivably, 
however, a disaffected right holder might object that the mere displacement by 
federal law of the state law regime governing pre-1972 sound recordings violates 
due process. 
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., however, the 
Court rejected a similar due process challenge to the federal Price-Anderson Act, 
which capped private and government liability in the event of a nuclear incident.297  
Without any nuclear incident having occurred, objectors claimed that the “liability-
limitation provision . . . fails to provide those injured by a nuclear accident with a 
satisfactory quid pro quo for the common-law rights of recovery” that the federal 
law abrogates.298  Noting, as an initial matter, that it is not even clear that due 
process requires that a “legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate 
the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy,” the Court 
determined that, in any event, the federal act does “provide a reasonably just 
substitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces” and satisfies 
due process requirements.299  The legislative history reflected “Congress’ 
determination that reliance on state tort law remedies and state-court procedures 
was an unsatisfactory approach to assuring public compensation for nuclear 
accidents, while at the same time providing the necessary incentives for private 
development of nuclear-produced energy.”300  Thus, the statutory limitations on 
liability bore a “rational relationship” to Congress’s goal of increasing private 
production of such energy sources.301 
Applying this reasoning to the pre-1972 sound recordings context, it seems 
 
 295. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 10, § 1.01[C] (collecting cases). 
 296. See e.g., Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat’l Labs., 574 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding 
that because plaintiffs’ cause of action did not arise until after passage of the federal act, they had “no 
prior vested right in a cause of action under” state law and rejecting due process claim); Carr v. United 
States,  422  F.2d  1007,  1010−11  (4th  Cir.  1970)  (same);;  accord Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as 
Private Property:  Implications for Eminent Domain, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 398 (2009) 
(“Prospective regulations that diminish or eliminate unaccrued causes of action (or defenses) do not 
implicate property rights.”); Radin, supra note 115, at 1328 (arguing that “[c]hanges to accrued rights 
(retroactive change) can implicate a property interest, while changes to nonaccured rights (prospective 
change) should not” and that accrual occurs “once a party can determine the legal consequences of an 
action because the injury has happened and the law at the time of injury is known”). 
 297. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc.,  438  U.S.  59,  64−67  (1978);;  see also 
Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (“[T]he Constitution does not forbid the creation of new 
rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative 
object.”). 
 298. See Duke Power,  438  U.S.  at  87−88. 
 299. See id. at 88. 
 300. See id. at 89. 
 301. See id. at 84. 
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readily apparent that as long as the federalizing legislation bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate legislative goal, which this Article argues it does, then 
the mere substitution of federal rights and remedies will not trigger a due process 
violation.  The Court has approved these sorts of legislative substitutions in the 
past.302  And, as in Duke Power, the federal rights and remedies—while not exactly 
co-extensive—are “reasonably just substitute[s]” for the state law rights and 
remedies they replace.303  Moreover, the revocation of punitive damages in favor of 
a statutory damages scheme should not be deemed to violate due process even if it 
can be demonstrated that statutory damages generally yield a smaller monetary 
award for right holders successful in litigation.  In approving the substitution of 
workers’ compensation regimes in place of common law standards (and as 
reaffirmed in Duke Power) due process is not violated “simply because an injured 
party would not be able to recover as much under the Act as before its 
enactment.”304 
Courts should be reluctant to find a cognizable takings claim based solely on an 
objection to the substitution of governing regimes.305  While there is limited 
Supreme Court precedent directly on point, considerable precedent from the Ninth 
Circuit strongly suggests that this line of argument would not be fruitful for 
stakeholders.306  For example, that court recently rejected a takings claim raised by 
plaintiffs challenging the legislative revision of a state program whereby property 
owners could seek either just compensation or exemptions from land use 
regulations.307  The new law curtailed the remedies and processes available to 
property owners who had already begun seeking relief under the old program.308  
Indeed, the plaintiffs had all been granted exemptions prior to the revision but, 
following the legislative overhaul, were unable to develop their land pursuant to the 
 
 302. We have not here distinguished at a more granular level among causes of action that are based 
on tort, contract or property.  There is some support for the notion that the abridgment of accrued causes 
of action to enforce vested intellectual property rights created by statute is more suspect than the 
abridgement of the typical tort cause of action.  See Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 
1986) (citing Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331 (1928), which dealt with 
patent rights).  But, as the Hammond court noted, the “vitality [of such older cases] may now be in doubt 
because more recent cases have upheld retroactive application of statutes that abridge economic and real 
property rights created under a prior statute without always carefully distinguishing the older cases.”  Id. 
at 11. 
 303. Accord Bowers v. Whitman, 671 F.3d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting substantive due 
process challenge where state replaced one set of remedies with another set of remedies). 
 304. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93 (citing N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917)). 
 305. One commentator, surveying the case law, suggests that “courts rarely treat legal rights as 
private property for purposes of the Takings Clause.”  Radin, supra note 115, at 1319. 
 306. In Duke Power, for example, the Court essentially found such a claim too speculative because 
it assumed that compensation for physical property damage would still be available under the Tucker 
Act.  See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 94 n.39; see also In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 
F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that federal statute, which substituted a remedy against the 
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for causes of action against contractors arising under 
state law, did not effect a taking). 
 307. See Bowers,  671  F.3d  at  909−910. 
 308. See id. at 910. 
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exemptions; nor had they received any monetary compensation.309 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim to property in the form of an accrued 
cause of action under the prior law.310  The court underscored that “although a 
cause of action is a species of property, a party’s property right in any cause of 
action does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment is obtained,” because the 
interest is still inchoate and does not afford certainty of expectation.311  The 
exemptions previously granted failed in and of themselves to convey vested 
interests because they did not entitle the property owners to any particular 
compensation or use of their property.  Because the plaintiffs had at most only a 
cause of action and not a final judgment under the prior law, they possessed an 
insufficient property interest.  “Their right to sue,” said the court, “was therefore 
not a property interest protected by the Takings Clause.”312  In another case, the 
same court put the point more bluntly:  “a plaintiff’s interest in a prospective 
punitive damages award does not qualify as ‘property’ under the Takings 
Clause.”313 
Such precedent suggests that courts should reject a takings claim based on the 
mere displacement of state rights and remedies by federal rights and remedies. 
F.  RESTRICTIONS ON USERS 
The federalizing legislation could effectively restrict the activities of users who 
engaged in activities that were permitted (or at least tolerated) under state law—for 
example, certain noncommercial uses.  This Article next examines the likelihood 
that such users might successfully raise a due process or takings claim.314 
The Golan v. Gonzales case addressed a due process claim in somewhat 
analogous circumstances.315  The subject of the Golan case was the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA), which restored the copyrights in certain works of 
foreign origin that had been in the public domain in the United States.316  The 
Golan plaintiffs claimed that the law impermissibly curtailed their use of those 
works, which they had exploited in reliance on those works being (and remaining) 
in the public domain.  They argued, inter alia, that the URAA imposed retroactive 
burdens on them and that the provisions in the law designed to protect them as 
 
 309. See id. at 911. 
 310. See id. at 913. 
 311. Id. at 914 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 312. Id.  The court also rejected a takings argument on the ground of a statutory entitlement to 
compensation because, among other things, “no monetary commitment was unequivocally made.”  Id. at 
915.  Nor had plaintiffs exhausted the remedies that were available to them.  See id. at 916. 
 313. Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 314. As one commentator has pointed out, often it can be more difficult for defendants than 
plaintiffs to persuade courts as to retroactivity problems.  See Radin, supra note 115, at 1344 (noting that 
“defendants find it difficult to successfully challenge statutes that retroactively create new rights of 
action because they cannot point to an explicit legal right that the legislation impaired”). 
 315. See Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 
2005), aff’d, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007), remanded to Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. 
Colo. 2009), rev’d, remanded to 609 F.3d 1076, (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 316. See supra notes 32−37 and accompanying text. 
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reliance parties were insufficient.317  According to plaintiffs, the law effectively 
denied them their Fifth Amendment right to due process. 
The district court acknowledged that plaintiffs had invested in uses of the works, 
but rejected their contention that the URAA imposed retroactive burdens on them.  
The court explained that “[a] statute does not operate retrospectively merely 
because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s 
enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.”318  The court went on to 
observe that whether a change to the law operates retroactively depends on the 
“nature and extent” of the change and “the degree of connection between the 
operation of the new rule and the relevant past event.”319  It held that “[t]hough the 
plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the entry of the works at issue into the public 
domain, any expectations they had of perpetual rights of exploitation could not 
reasonably have been settled.”320  The court explained that because Congress had 
on several occasions removed works from the public domain, plaintiffs’ rights were 
“anything but inviolate.”321 
Even if copyright restoration were considered retroactive in effect, according to 
the court, it would not violate the Fifth Amendment since it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective—extending protection to foreign authors to 
achieve similar protection for U.S. authors abroad—and it contains provisions to 
ameliorate its effect on reliance parties.322  The plaintiffs apparently did not pursue 
the due process claim on appeal,323 so neither the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
nor the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on it. 
Any claim that the federalizing legislation under discussion would defeat users’ 
expectations of perpetual rights of exploitation in pre-1972 sound recordings 
appears to be weaker than that mounted in Golan, where most of the restored works 
were in the public domain throughout the United States.  The uncertainty of the 
law, the evolving nature of common law and the existence of strong protection in 
some states would make it difficult for a challenger to claim its expectations were 
reasonable.  Moreover, there is little doubt that Congress, in enacting the 
federalizing legislation, would be pursuing legitimate government objectives—
creating a single regime of protection for sound recordings, and enhancing the 
ability to preserve and use pre-1972 recordings—in a rational manner. 
One commentator has suggested that the federalizing legislation should contain 
a graduated phase-in aspect, modeled after the URAA, by which users who were 
 
 317. For example, the law provides that a reliance party who was using a restored work prior to 
restoration may continue to exploit existing copies for one year after that party receives actual or 
constructive notice of the right holder’s intent to enforce the copyright.  See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2), (e) 
(2012).  If the reliance party had created a derivative work prior to restoration, the reliance party could 
continue to use the work if it compensated the right holder.  See id. § 104A(d)(2). 
 318. Golan, 2005 WL 914754, at *17 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 
(1994) (citations omitted)). 
 319. Id. at *18. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See Golan  v.  Gonzales,  501  F.3d  1179,  1181−82  (10th  Cir.  2007). 
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“reliance parties”—that is, who “made investments and agreements for the use of a 
sound recording in a context that is permissible under state law but improper under 
federal law”—would have a chance to adjust their behavior before being deemed 
copyright infringers.324 
It also seems unlikely that a court would recognize a takings claim asserted on 
behalf of users who would argue that their use of pre-1972 sound recordings prior 
to federalization established a cognizable property interest.  As discussed above in 
Part V.E., this appears to be a mere substitution of regimes, which would result in 
more clearly defined and consistently available exceptions and limitations.  Indeed, 
it is telling that users (including libraries), rather than right holders, have been the 
primary motivating force behind the initiative to federalize pre-1972 sound 
recordings, with many claiming that federal exceptions are more certain and 
predictable than what state law provides.325 
There is no Supreme Court precedent directly on point.  In Golan v. Holder, 
however, the Court rejected the claim that pre-restoration users of foreign works 
whose U.S. copyrights were restored by the URAA established a vested First 
Amendment interest that entitled them to continue to use the restored works 
without obligation to the right holders.326  In fact, a claim that use of pre-1972 
sound recordings prior to their federalization established an ownership interest in 
those recordings appears weaker than the claim made in Golan.  Arguably some of 
pre-1972 recordings were effectively in the public domain in some states.  But in 
other states, those recordings could not be considered to be in the public domain, 
and any property rights therefore belong to the initial right holders and their 
transferees, rather than to users. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, if Congress were to adopt the type of proposal offered by the 
Copyright Office, cognizant of the modifications suggested herein, it should 
significantly alleviate the principal takings and due process concerns that have been 
discussed.  Such legislation could serve as a helpful framework for future 
legislative amendments to the intellectual property laws. 
 
 
 324. Erlinger, supra note 68,  at  76−77. 
 325. E.g., Loughney, Comments of Library of Congress in Response to Notice of Inquiry, supra 
note 28,  at  1,  3−5;;  Brooks,  Comments  at  Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Public Meeting, supra note 28, at 
18−19.    But see Brandon Butler, Ass’n of Research Libraries, Comments at Pre-1972 Sound Recordings 
Public   Meeting   155−60   (June   2,   2011),   available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/ 
transcript-06-02-2011.pdf. 
 326. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
